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Executive Summary 
This report analyses the impact of product market reforms, in the form of the EU Single 
Market Programme, on the extent of product market competition and the subsequent effects of 
competition on innovation activity and productivity growth.  
The report first summarises the main messages from the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between competition and innovation and uses this to inform the 
subsequent empirical analysis. The theoretical literature on competition and growth 
emphasises the importance of economic profits, or rents, in providing incentives for firms to 
innovate to compete for market position or in order to enter new markets. Increased 
competition may increase incentives for firms to increase efficiency or to innovate in order to 
protect or enhance their market position. However, competition may reduce the rewards to 
innovation or entry into a market and thus discourage these activities. 
The main empirical analysis carried out in the report is centred on the manufacturing sector, 
as this is where the product market reforms that analysed have the greatest impact and where 
the majority of research and development expenditure and patenting activity is carried out. 
The analysis exploits country-industry level information on the expected degree of impact of 
the Single Market Programme in order to identify effects of changes in the extent of 
competition on innovation and productivity growth.  
We relate information across industries and countries on the product market reforms 
associated with the Single Market Programme to changes in mark-ups, which are used to 
measure the degree of product market competition, (the greater the extent of competition, the 
less able are firms to mark-up prices above costs). To investigate the relationship between 
competition and innovation, we use country-industry level information on business sector 
R&D expenditure and data on patenting activity by individual firms across countries. The data 
on patents enables us to look at whether product market reforms impact differentially on 
incumbents (defined as firms that are already innovative and actively patenting) compared to 
new entrants into innovative activity. 
Innovation in service sectors is inherently more difficult to measure, and measures of R&D 
expenditure do not capture the introduction of new services or other quality improvements 
and cost reductions well in service sectors. However the bulk of economic activity in most EU 
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countries is in services. The report therefore presents some indicative evidence on the 
relationship between competition and productivity growth in service sectors. 
We also present an initial exploration into the ways in which a country’s distance to the 
international technological leader or frontier, (i.e. the scope for technological catch-up), and 
labour market regulations are related to variation in innovation and productivity growth rates. 
The main empirical findings suggest the following: 
•  The product market reforms that were associated with the Single Market Programme 
lead to a reduction in the average mark-up, i.e. an increase in product market 
competition, in affected countries and industries. 
•  Increased competition (as measured by the mark-up) led to increased R&D investment 
in manufacturing industries. 
•  The Single Market Programme may have had an additional direct negative impact on 
R&D expenditure in some high-tech manufacturing industries. However, it is not clear 
whether this actually represented a reduction in innovative outputs or an increase in 
the efficiency of R&D spending in these industries across EU countries. 
•  Competition increased innovative activity by incumbents, but if anything it decreased 
incentives for new firms to enter into the innovation process. This is consistent with 
theory which suggests that increased competition reduces the potential rewards to 
innovation for entrants, but may increase it for incumbents if it reduces pre-innovation 
rents by more than post-innovation rents. 
•  There is some indication that, within an industry, the effect of increasing competition 
on innovation is larger in countries that are closer to the global technological frontier. 
However, this result may also reflect the fact that a higher proportion of innovative 
activity is measured as formal R&D or patents in countries that are more 
technologically advanced. With existing data (i.e. without information on imitation 
activity) it is difficult to distinguish between these two effects. 
•  Increased R&D investment led to faster total factor productivity growth in 
manufacturing industries. 
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•  There is some indication that competition (as measured by the mark-up) is associated 
with faster productivity growth in the service sector, but this result should be seen as 
an association rather than a causal relationship. Given their importance in modern 
economies, the impact of competition on innovation in service sectors represents an 
interesting avenue for further research. 
•  The effect of labour market regulations on innovation and productivity growth is 
complex and a detailed examination is beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
above results are robust to controlling for the direct effects of a range of labour market 
regulations on innovation. 
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1  Introduction 
The growth of value-added per capita in EU countries has lagged behind the US in recent 
years, and this is widely believed to be due, in large part, to lower levels of innovation and 
lower rates of adoption of the latest technologies. This is despite widespread reforms to 
product markets across EU countries aimed at increasing productivity, employment and 
growth.  
With this in mind, the European Council adopted the Lisbon Agenda, calling for the EU to 
become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by the 
end of the current decade through reforms to product, labour and capital markets. It set a 
target in Barcelona to raise R&D investment to 3% of the EU’s GDP, as well as objectives to 
increase the employment rate, the level of labour productivity and the rate of output growth.
1  
In light of these strategic policy objectives, the purpose of this study is to analyse and 
measure the impact of product market reforms on innovation activity undertaken in the 
European Union and the subsequent impact on total factor productivity. Our focus is on the 
private sector, and we restrict our attention to non-network industries.
2
The research aims to inform policy that affects both frontier innovation and imitation, or 
technology transfer. Frontier innovation is the creation of new goods, services or processes, 
and occurs both in incumbent firms, and through the entry of new firms. Diffusion of new 
technologies is also an important source of growth, particularly for firms and industries far 
behind the technological frontier. Diffusion is affected by the actions of incumbent firms, and 
also by firm entry and exit. 
Two important caveats are worth noting. One is that growth is driven by a large number of 
factors other than product market institutions. Other factors, such as human capital 
development, infrastructure provision and fiscal stability are likely to be major elements. The 
other is that the bulk of economic activity in most EU countries is in service sectors. 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that some of these objectives may be in conflict with each other. For example, increasing 
employment may conflict with raising labour productivity if new workers have lower average skill levels than 
existing workers, or if most new jobs are created in sectors with low average productivity. 
2 Network industries include telecommunications, post, electricity, water, gas, airlines and rail. In most countries 
these industries are regulated. However, the nature of reforms and the processes driving innovation and 
technology transfer in these industries differ substantially from the rest of the economy and would require 
detailed modelling of each industry. 
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Innovation in service sectors is difficult to measure, and the indicators that we use – R&D 
expenditure and patents – do not capture well the introduction of new services or other quality 
improvements and cost reductions in service sectors.  
The structure of this report is as follows. In Section 2 we highlight the main themes in the 
literature that inform our methodology, (a full literature review is contained in Appendix I), 
and in Section 3 we outline our empirical approach. Section 4 describes the data and provides 
a discussion of the indicators of product market reforms and other types of regulation that we 
use in our empirical analysis, focusing on the sources of variation which allow us to identify 
the relevant economic relationships.
3 In Section 5 we present results on the impact of product 
market reforms on R&D performed at the national and industry level. We also use data on 
patenting activity by individual firms across countries to look at whether product market 
reforms impact differentially on incumbents (firms that are already innovative) and on 
entrants into innovative activity. We then explore the ways in which distance to the frontier 
(i.e. the scope for technological catch-up) and labour market regulations are related to 
variation in innovation and total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates.
4 A final section 
summarises and concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Appendix II contains further details of different measures of innovation and imitation and discusses trends in 
innovative activity across EU countries. Appendix III contains further discussion of product market regulations 
and reforms, and Appendix IV contains more detail on how we measure the mark-up. 
4 Appendix V provides some additional results. 
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2  The literature 
The theoretical literature on competition and growth emphasises the importance of economic 
profits, or rents, in providing incentives for firms to innovate to compete for market position 
or in order to enter new markets. Increased competition may increase incentives for firms to 
reduce slack
5 or to innovate in order to protect or enhance their market position or to escape 
competition.
6 However, it also may reduce the rewards to innovation or entry into a market 
and thus discourage these activities. 
Traditional models of imperfect competition based on price competition and product 
differentiation, e.g. the Hotelling linear model, the circular version of that model by Salop 
(1977), or the symmetric model of monopolistic competition by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), all 
deliver the prediction that more intense product market competition reduces the rents of those 
firms that successfully enter the market, and therefore it discourages firms from entering, or 
innovating, in the first place. This is what is often called the “Schumpeterian effect” of 
product market competition on innovation. 
An alternative approach considers how competition affects an incumbent firm engaged in a 
race with a potential entrant for a new innovation that will reduce costs. Who will invest more 
R&D resources in the race, the incumbent or the potential entrant? The answer turns out to be 
ambiguous, and relies on the trade-off between two opposite effects: a rent dissipation effect 
and a replacement effect. The replacement effect (Arrow, 1962) refers to the fact that, by 
innovating, the incumbent monopolist replaces her own rents, whereas the potential entrant 
has no pre-existing rents to replace. Everything else remaining equal, this effect will induce 
the entrant to invest more in the race than the incumbent firm. On the other hand, the rent 
dissipation effect refers to the fact that the incumbent may lose more by letting the entrant win 
the race (she dissipates the difference between her current monopoly rents and the duopoly 
rents if the entrant innovates) than the potential entrant does by letting the incumbent win the 
race (he loses the difference between what may be at best duopoly rents if he had won the 
race and zero if the incumbent wins). The rent dissipation effect may or may not counteract 
the replacement effect. If it does, then the incumbent ends up investing more in the race than 
the potential entrant. 
                                                 
5 See, inter alia, Hart (1983) and Schmidt (1999). 
6 See, inter alia, Gilbert and Newbury (1982) and Aghion et al (2005). 
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The Industrial Organisation literature emphasizes the comparison between monopoly and 
duopoly profits, and the fact that when competition generates enough rent dissipation (reduces 
duopoly profits sufficiently), then the difference between monopoly and duopoly profits is 
much greater than duopoly profits themselves, so that the incumbent is more likely to win the 
race and thereby persist as monopoly. 
The prediction that product market competition has an unambiguously negative effect on 
entry or innovation is shared by the models of endogenous technical change in Growth 
Theory. In all of these models, an increase in product market competition has a negative effect 
on productivity growth by reducing the monopoly rents that reward new innovation. An 
increase in the ability of other firms in the industry to imitate has a similar effect. This 
discourages firms from engaging in R&D activities, thereby lowering the innovation rate and 
therefore also the rate of long-run growth, which in these models is proportional to the 
innovation rate. In the product variety framework of Romer (1990) this property is directly 
inherited from the Dixit-Stiglitz model upon which this model is built. But the same effect is 
also at work in the Schumpeterian (or quality-ladder) models of Aghion-Howitt (1992) and 
Grossman-Helpman (1991), which both predict that competition policy is unambiguously 
detrimental to growth, increased product market competition discourage innovation and 
growth by reducing the payoff incumbent innovators can obtain. 
Recent endogenous growth models extend the basic Schumpeterian model by allowing 
incumbent firms to innovate (e.g. Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers, (1997, 2001)). In these 
models, innovation incentives depend on the difference between post-innovation and pre-
innovation rents (the latter were equal to zero in the basic model where all innovations were 
made by outsiders). In this case, more product market competition may end up fostering 
innovation and growth, as it may reduce a firm’s pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces 
its post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental profits 
from innovating, and thereby encourage R&D investments aimed at "escaping competition". 
These models predict that the innovative behaviour of firms (industries or countries) will vary 
with their distance to the technological frontier. Aghion et al (2005b), henceforth ABGHP,  
focus on the incentive effects of frontier entry on incumbents incentives to innovate. Other 
papers consider the ability of firms to benefit from spillovers. 
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ABGHP consider the impact of entry threat on incumbent innovation effort. The main 
implication of their model is that a higher threat from technologically advanced entrants 
should encourage incumbent innovation in sectors that are initially close to the technological 
frontier (an escape-competition effect), whereas it may discourage incumbent innovation in 
sectors that are initially further behind the frontier (a discouragement effect of entry). The 
intuition for these two effects is that, in the former case, incumbent firms that are initially 
close to the frontier can potentially escape competition by innovating; therefore tougher 
competition, or a higher threat of entry, will result in more intensive innovation activities 
aimed at escaping that threat. The latter results relies on the potential entrant being near the 
technological frontier. In that case incumbents that are further behind the frontier see no hope 
to win, so do not invest. This yields the prediction that innovation and productivity growth of 
incumbents in sectors close to the world technological frontier should react more positively to 
competition and entry (so long as it is at the frontier) than in sectors further below the 
frontier.
7 In the ABGHP model, if there is no threat of entry then incumbent performance 
would be greater the further the sector is from the frontier (i.e. the level effect of the distance 
to the frontier would be positive). Such a positive effect of the initial distance to frontier on 
expected productivity growth is in fact found in any model with convergence.  
The ABGHP model is about incumbent firms’ innovation incentives. There is also a literature 
on knowledge spillovers that makes predictions about how imitation and productivity growth 
may vary with distance to the frontier. This literature highlights two effects that work in 
opposite directions. Some models consider the idea that firms and sectors further from the 
frontier should benefit most from knowledge spillovers, since the scope for learning is highest 
there.
8 Thus imitation would be highest the further away a firm is from the frontier. Another 
idea that is prevalent in the literature on knowledge spillovers is that firms in industries closer 
to the technological frontier have higher absorptive capacity, so may benefit more from 
spillovers.
9 This literature emphasises the two roles or “faces” of engaging in innovative 
                                                 
7 ABGHP focus on foreign entry. In their model, if entrants have productivity below the frontier, this gives the 
prediction that increasing the threat of entry encourages innovation and productivity growth in sectors that are at 
intermediate distance from the frontier, discourages innovation in sectors that are far below the frontier and has 
little effect on innovation in sectors close to the frontier. 
8 Griffith et al. (2004) find empirical support for such consequences of general spillovers looking across a panel 
of OECD industries and countries. Griffith et al. (2002) find similar evidence at the establishment level in the 
UK. 
9 See Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Aghion and Howitt (1997), Howitt (2000) and Griffith, Redding and Van 
Reenen (2004). 
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activity. The first of these roles is in stimulating innovation, the second role is in facilitating 
the imitation of others' discoveries. Some knowledge is “tacit”, difficult to codify in manuals 
and textbooks, and hard to acquire without direct investigation. By actively engaging in R&D 
in a particular intellectual or technological field, one acquires such tacit knowledge and can 
more easily understand and assimilate the discoveries of others. Under this model firms, 
industries or countries that are closer to the technological frontier should have higher 
outcomes on measures that reflect imitation.  
These models make no obvious predictions for innovation outcomes, or for an interaction 
between competition and the distance to frontier. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find empirical 
evidence for such an interaction. They adapt the model from Griffith, Redding and Van 
Reenen (2004) by substituting the extent of product market regulations for R&D, arguing that 
competition may induce firms behind the frontier to adopt best practice and up-to-date 
technologies. However, there is no obvious theoretical reason why the main impact of product 
market reforms is to encourage adoption of new technologies by firms and/or industries that 
are further behind the frontier. 
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3  Empirical approach 
From the discussion above we see that the theoretical literature emphasises the importance of 
economic profits, or rents, in providing incentives for firms to enter markets and to innovate. 
This has also been emphasised in the empirical literature, for example, Nickell (1996) and 
Aghion et al (2005a). Thus, to empirically investigate how product market reforms have 
affected innovation, one of our main interests is to investigate how product market reforms 
have affected the level of economic rents, and in turn how the level of rents has affected 
innovation. Product market reforms can affect competition through the intensity with which 
firms interact in the product market and through lowering the costs of entry. In equilibrium 
the level of rents reflects both these factors. Competitive intensity between firms will drive 
prices down, while entry, or the threat of entry, will restrain firms from raising prices. We 
start from the premise that the primary impact of product market reforms on productivity 
growth is through the pressure they put on firms to innovate and imitate, and that the main 
determinant of that is the potential rewards from doing so, as reflected in rents. However, 
product market reforms themselves may also have a direct effect on innovation and/or 
productivity growth, for example through the reallocation of resources towards more 
productive firms or activities. In all of our results we test for the direct effects of our measures 
of product market reforms as well as the indirect effects through their impact on the level of 
rents.  
Another way to think about the way we relate product market reforms to rents, and then rents 
to innovation, is to contrast it with other empirical approaches in the literature. Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003), for example, look at the impact of a large number of product market reforms 
on TFP growth. They aggregate the product market reforms into a single index. What we are 
doing is using the impact of various reforms on rents as a way of aggregating the reforms, 
rather than using ad hoc or subjective weights. 
These considerations suggest a general model that related competition to innovation and 
innovation to TFP growth of the general form: 
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        ( 1 )  
where  μ  is the mark-up and captures the extent of competition,  PMR stands for product 
market reforms, innov  represents various measures of innovation,  LP Δ   and   are 
measures of labour productivity and total factor productivity growth, and X captures other 
factors.  
TFP Δ
Despite our focus on product market competition, it is important to bear in mind that the level 
of competition is unlikely to be the single major determinant of innovation in a country or 
industry. Factors such as infrastructure, skills and technological opportunity may play a much 
more important role. These vary across countries, industries and technology classes and we 
are unlikely to be able to capture all of that variation. Therefore, we rely on variation within 
countries, industries and technology classes - this allows us to control for unobservable 
characteristics that may be correlated with the level of rents. The vector X  importantly 
includes country and time effects (and industry and technology class where relevant) and 
various other controls. 
Without further restrictions it is not possible to estimate all the parameters of this general 
model. Our strategy is to exclude most or all of our indicators of product market reforms from 
the innov, and LP / TFP growth equations, and then to test these exclusion restrictions using 
suitable econometric methods. In other words, we test for any direct effects of PMRs as well 
as the indirect effect through their impact on the level of rents. We would expect an 
immediate impact of PMRs to be to change the degree of product market competition firms 
face, which we summarise in our measure of the mark-up. This in turn would be the main 
channel through which product market reforms would affect innovation and imitation 
incentives. We also exclude the mark-up from the TFP growth equation. 
Our baseline model therefore takes the following form: 
    15 
()
()











          ( 2 )  
We also consider whether the level of rents has a direct effect on productivity growth. In 
service sector industries, where information on innovative activity is very difficult to obtain, 
(for example, relatively little R&D expenditure is carried out in this sector), we use 
productivity growth as a proxy for innovative activity, and explore direct relationships 
between productivity growth and the mark-up, 
( X f TFP LP , , ) μ = Δ Δ .           ( 3 )  
For manufacturing sectors we argue that it is more reasonable to consider the level of rents as 
only affecting productivity growth through its impact on the rate of innovation. As before we 
test the validity of this exclusion restriction. However there may be statistical and economic 
reasons why we cannot exclude the level of rents from the productivity growth equation. In 
particular, conventional measures of TFP are biased in the presence of mark-ups. Also, it is 
possible that product market competition increases productivity directly by forcing firms to 
increase their productive efficiency. We consider a more general model where we include 
measures of both innovation and the mark-up in the productivity growth equation and 
instrument these two variables. 
The final consideration is what enters the set of control variables X. We include country 
dummies (and industry and technology class where relevant) to control for unobserved factors 
that do not change over time. We also include a full set of time dummies to capture aggregate 
trends across all countries, as well as a control for the business cycle (deviations from trend 
output). As discussed in the previous section, much of the recent literature emphasizes the 
idea that the impact of product market competition on innovation and imitation may depend 
on other characteristics of the industry or country. The main other characteristic that we 
examine is distance to the technological frontier. We investigate the direct impact of distance 
to the frontier on innovation and productivity growth, as well as how it interacts with our 
measures of the mark-up.  
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A number of other issues are raised in the literature which we have not been able to 
investigate or where we have not been able to identify clear results. These include non-linear 
effects of competition, the effects of differences in credit market and labour market 
institutions, the sequencing of reforms and innovation in service sectors. These are discussed 
in section 5.5.  
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4  Data 
In order to implement the model discussed above empirically we need measures of innovation 
activity, the mark-up and product market regulations and reforms. We discuss these in turn. 
Further details are provided in Appendices II-IV. Appendix VI provides references for the 
various data sources. 
4.1  Innovative activity 
We focus on two measures of innovation activity - Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) 
expenditure and counts of patents taken out at the European Patents Office (we also consider 
triadic patents). We investigate both because R&D expenditures will capture resources 
devoted to all private sector innovative activity, not just that that is ultimately successful in 
producing new products and processes, whereas patents only capture successful innovation. 
Patents data are also available at the firm level, and we can therefore investigate whether the 
impact of product market reforms differ across entrants and incumbent firms. There is a 
strong correlation between our two main measures of innovation inputs and innovation 
outputs – BERD as a % of GDP and patenting per 1000 population. However the importance 
of patents as measures of innovation varies considerably across industries. Further discussion 
of these measures and how they vary across countries is given in Appendix II. 
A detailed description of innovative activity in our sample is given in Appendix II.2. Business 
Enterprise R&D (BERD) as a proportion of GDP, varies dramatically across European 
countries. Within countries there has also been substantial variation in the path of BERD as a 
percentage of GDP over time. For example between 1981 and 2001 BERD intensity in 
Sweden and in Finland increased by over 1.5 percentage points of GDP, whereas in the UK it 
actually decreased by 0.25 percentage points.  
Imitation is harder to measure. We do not have direct measures of the extent to which firms 
imitate or adopt the latest technological developments in other firms. Therefore, we proxy a 
country’s scope for benefiting from technological diffusion by the distance that it lies behind 
the technological frontier (the country with the highest productivity). This has the merit that it 
is easily measurable with available data for a wide range of countries and time periods. We 
therefore investigate whether product market reforms have different impacts on innovative 
activity and on macro-performance depending on the extent to which countries lie behind the 
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frontier. If they do, this implies that policy reforms of this type may have differential effects 
depending on a country’s relative technological position. However, as we discuss later on, 
without better data on imitation activity than exists at present it is very difficult to distinguish 
whether any differential impact of competition on innovation with distance to the frontier is 
due to different effects on incentives to innovate, or because of differences in measurement 
between innovation and imitation activity. 
Finally, we measure then growth of total factor productivity growth using a superlative index 
(Caves et al, 1982). The data comes from the OECD STAN database which provides 
information at the two-digit industry level on value added, labour and capital stocks. Our TFP 
growth sample consists of 12 two-digit industries across nine countries over the period 1988-
2000. 
The growth rate of TFP for a country-industry is defined as 
() () ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 / ln ~ 1 / ln ~ / ln − − − − − − = Δ t t t t t t t K K L L V V TFP α α  
where V denotes real value-added (converted to US dollars using an economy-wide PPP), α ~ 
is the average labour share over t and t-1, 
() 1 2
1 ~
− + = t t α α α , 
L is numbers employed and K is capital stock (converted to US dollars using an economy-
wide PPP). One concern that is often expressed in the literature is that the share of labour in 
value-added can be quite volatile. This is suggestive of measurement error, so we check that 
our main results are robust to the adjustment suggested by Harrigan (1997). This involves 
exploiting the properties of the translog production function to smooth the observed labour 
shares.
 10   
                                                 
10 Under the assumption of a translog production function and standard market-clearing conditions, the labour 
share can be expressed as a function of the capital-labour ratio and a country-industry constant. If actual labour 
shares deviate from their true values by an i.i.d. measurement error term, then the parameters of this equation can 
be estimated by fixed effects panel data estimation, where we allow the coefficient on the capital-labour ratio to 
vary across industries j. The fitted values from this equation are then used as the labour cost shares in our 
calculation of TFP growth. 
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Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of TFP growth, ln R&D expenditure and 
R&D intensity in a panel of manufacturing industries. Further discussion of innovative 
activity and productivity growth is contained in Appendix II. 
Table 1: Mean TFP growth and R&D 
  Growth in TFP 
(standard deviation) 







Belgium 0.012  4.489  0.051  95 
 (0.091)  (1.396)  (0.050)   
Canada 0.020  4.892  0.033  166 
 (0.051)  (1.409)  (0.049)   
Denmark 0.010  5.331  0.043  91 
 (0.065)  (1.853)  (0.058)   
Finland 0.029  3.602  0.051  140 
 (0.065)  (1.235)  (0.043)   
France 0.015  5.978  0.105  82 
 (0.098)  (1.230)  (0.160)   
Netherlands 0.012 4.126 0.042  136 
 (0.066)  (1.686)  (0.050)   
Norway 0.007  5.045  0.041  108 
 (0.062)  (1.380)  (0.043)   
United Kingdom  0.020  5.435  0.061  150 
 (0.050)  (1.556)  (0.065)   
United States  0.016  7.967  0.078  154 
 (0.059)  (1.615)  (0.099)   
        
Total 0.017  5.229  0.055  1,122 
 (0.066)  (1.963)  (0.076)   
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 12 two-digit industries over the period 1987-2000. 
4.2  The mark-up 
As discussed above, the main channel through which product market reforms are expected to 
affect innovation outcomes is the level of rents, or economic profits, in the market. This is 
difficult to measure. We construct a measure of the mark-up, or profitability, at the whole 
economy level, and for sub-sectors of the economy including manufacturing and business 
service sector industries. Boone (2000) shows that this measure of competition is preferred to 
most other commonly used measures. It is more theoretically robust, particularly than those 
based on market concentration and market shares, and it is the only commonly-used measure 
of competition that is available across countries. 
Our measure of economic rents is value-added as a share of labour and capital costs:   
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where all variables are in nominal prices. This simple measure of the mark-up can be shown 
to be equivalent to that proposed by Roeger (1995),
11 and contains an implicit assumption of 
constant returns to scale, such that marginal cost is equal to average cost. To the extent that 
there are increasing (decreasing) returns to scale this measure will be biased downwards 
(upwards) compared to the true mark-up. While value-added and labour costs are observed in 
the data, capital costs are not. We construct a perpetual inventory measure of the capital stock 
using data on investment, and use cross-country averages of available capital deflators for 
countries where these are not available. We calculate the cost of capital assuming that capital 
flows freely across borders so that all countries face a world interest rate, which we model as 
the US long term interest rate. In our main results we instrument the mark-up with exogenous 
changes in competition, which should help to control for classical measurement error.  
Assuming that all countries face the same world interest rate might conceivably induce bias in 
the results if some countries have liberalised their credit markets during the period in a way 
that is correlated with reforms to product markets. However, none of our main results is 
sensitive to using an alternative assumption of closed capital markets, or even a constant 10% 
cost of capital across countries. 
Table 2 shows the mean of the rents variable for the whole economy, and for manufacturing 
separately. More discussion is provided in Appendix IV. 
Table 2: Mean of rents 
  Rents (whole economy)  Rents (manufacturing) 
Australia 1.208  1.296 
Belgium 1.194  1.161 
Canada 1.282  1.236 
Denmark 1.087  1.123 
France 1.183  1.223 
Great Britain  1.261  1.124 
Italy 1.314  1.257 
Netherlands 1.165  1.189 
Norway 1.149  1.060 
USA 1.384  1.240 
 
There is wide and sometimes surprising variation in the average level of rents across 
countries. For example, the US has one of the highest level of rents, which runs counter to our 
intuition about the degree of competition in the US and Europe. There are various data 
                                                 
11 See Klette (1999) for a discussion. 
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incompatibilities in the measurement of capital and value added across countries that affect 
the cross-section variation in the average level of rents, and for this reason we include country 
dummies to control for any such factors that are constant over time. This is one of the main 
reasons why it is important to have indicators of product market reforms that vary over time, 
since cross-sectional variation in reforms cannot be separately identified from country 
dummies, which help to control for these important sources of measurement error. As stressed 
above, our results are based on time-series variation in rents within countries and/or 
industries. 
The second surprising feature of measured rents is that it appears to trend upwards over time 
for most countries (see Appendix IV). At first this may seem to conflict with most 
preconceptions about changes to the degree of competition associated with product market 
reforms, globalisation and opening to trade. One explanation, discussed by Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003) and Boulhol (2004), is that upwards trending measured rents could be a short 
term response to reductions in the bargaining power of workers. The intuition is that declining 
bargaining power reduces the share of rents captured by workers as higher wages, and 
increases the share that are measured in firms’ profits. In the long term, the increase in 
profitability associated with declining workers’ bargaining power would be expected to lead 
to entry and a reduction of rents to their previous level, but to the extent that these effects 
occur with lags it is possible for the rent transfer effect to dominate the entry effect during the 
transition period. There are a range of other factors that might explain an upwards trending 
mark-up over time, including increases in returns to scale. However, what is important from 
our point of view is that differential changes in mark-ups across countries and industries can 
be shown to be related to product market reforms in ways that accord with theory. We discuss 
this further in the results section. In Appendix V we show that controlling for this type of 
effect, by including proxies for workers' bargaining power in our regressions, such as union 
density, bargaining coverage, benefit replacement rates and employment protection 
legislation, does not substantially affect our results. 
Another feature of our measured mark-ups is that they are generally pro-cyclical. We include 
an OECD country-level measure of the output gap in all regressions (calculated as a deviation 
from trend growth) to control for this. As discussed in Appendix IV, we might be concerned 
that this will not remove all of the cyclical variation in the mark-up. However, any excess pro-
cyclicality in the mark would induce if anything a positive bias in our OLS estimates. For 
example, if R&D or productivity growth are pro-cyclical, excess cyclicality in the mark-up 
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could bias the coefficient on the mark-up in a positive direction, which means that the size of 
our results would be understated (we find negative coefficients on the mark-up). In addition, 
when we instrument the mark-up with our indicators of product market reforms, the estimated 
coefficient becomes more negative in almost all cases. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the instrumental variables (IV) estimates control for measurement error in the mark-up 
that is associated with excess cyclicality.  
4.3  Product market regulations and reforms 
One of the main challenges in the literature looking at the impact of product market 
competition on innovation is the endogeneity of competition. Product market reforms can 
provide useful exogenous variation to enable researchers to identify the causal impact of 
competition on innovation. In addition, the effect of specific policies may be of direct interest 
to policy makers. 
In order to be able to estimate the impact of a policy reform on outcomes we need to observe 
data both before and after the reform, and the reform must have affected different countries, 
industries or firms differently. Without this variation we can not identify the impact of the 
reform. 
An important indicator of product market reform that we use is based on the implementation 
of the European Single Market Programme (SMP) in the early 1990s. This was a large scale 
project by the then members of the European Union to reduce internal non-tariff barriers to 
trade and other barriers to the free movement and factors of production across borders. The 
SMP is a large reform, and it was undertaken across a large number of countries. It was, 
however, undertaken at around the same time across countries. This means that to identify the 
impact of the SMP from other contemporaneous macroeconomic effects (for example, the 
recession of the early 1990s) we need to either include countries that were not involved in 
SMP as a control group, or use variation in the impact it had across different industries.  
We also use other indicators of product market reforms to supplement the SMP-based 
indicators (see Appendix III for a detailed discussion). However, in general we have found 
that the SMP-based indicators have the most explanatory power and can be most closely 
linked to specific reforms. 
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4.3.1  Country-level indicators 
We have used various sources of information to construct an indicator of the impact of the 
SMP at the country level. One identification strategy is to use countries that did not take part 
in the SMP as a control group for countries that did take part, i.e. use a simple difference-in-
difference estimate of the impact of the SMP. In order for these to be good controls they need 
to represent on average what would have happened in the affected countries in the absence of 
the SMP. We examine the robustness of our results to using different control groups. 
We have also investigated the possibility of differentiating the effects of the SMP between 
participant countries. This involves refining the simple in-out control group approach by 
obtaining measures of how large the impact of the SMP was for each participant country. 
Although this may create more accurate measures of the expected effects of the SMP, it turns 
out that most of the variation in the data is between SMP and non-SMP countries, so the 
control group approach continues to be our main identification strategy at the country level.
12  
We use two additional sources of information to refine our SMP indicator. The first is the data 
on the expected degree of impact of the SMP on different manufacturing industries contained 
in Buigues et al (1990) (described below). The authors identify which industries are expected 
to be highly and moderately affected by the SMP, and we combine this information with the 
share of those industries in manufacturing output before the implementation of the SMP to 
generate the ex ante share of output in each country that was expected to be affected by the 
SMP. The second additional source of information that we use to refine our indicator of the 
SMP is related to the extent and speed with which the SMP was actually implemented in each 
participant country. We use the European Commission’s published Internal Market 
Scoreboard which contains the rate of non-implementation of single market directives for 
each candidate country (the “transposition deficit”).  
We have investigated many other potential indicators of product market reform (see Appendix 
III for more discussion). For the country-level econometric analysis we use two further 
indicators that might be expected to be important, and which appear to affect mark-ups in 
ways that are consistent with theory. The first is an index of “Time senior management spends 
with government bureaucracy” constructed by the Fraser Institute. This is based on survey 
                                                 
12 In our main industry-level results (discussed below) we test whether our results are robust to using only 
variation within the SMP countries. 
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responses to the question “How much time does your firm's senior management spend 
dealing/negotiating with government officials?”. A large amount of time spent with 
government bureaucracy may constitute a barrier to entry, hinder firms’ expansion, or may 
indicate a significant amount of government involvement in business decision-making, all of 
which can inhibit competition. The index ranges from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating the highest 
level of regulation and 10 indicating the lowest level of regulation. We also use an index of 
“How easy it is to start a new business” constructed by the Fraser Institute. This is based on 
survey responses and is available for the years 1995 and 2000. The index ranges from 1 to 10, 
with 1 indicating the highest level of regulation and 10 indicating the lowest level of 
regulation. Both of these indices are based on data published in the World Economic Forum's 
"Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002".  
Table 3 shows the mean of the country level indicator. More details about the definitions of 
these measures and how they vary over time are given in Appendix III. 
Table 3: Mean of product market variables 
 SMP  Administrative  Burden  on 
Business 
1=high, 10=low 
Ease of entry 
1=high regulation, 10=low 
regulation 
Australia 0  7.099  6.860 
Belgium 12.929  6.743  4.782 
Canada 0  7.110 7.780 
Denmark 13.392  8.829  6.320 
France 13.043  6.480  3.580 
Great Britain  13.364  7.820  8.060 
Italy 13.537  4.841  4.201 
Netherlands 11.869  7.571  7.510 
Norway 0  8.159 7.161 
USA 0  7.570  8.400 
 
4.3.2  Industry-level indicator 
As well as the country level variation we also use the differential impact of the Single Market 
Program (SMP) across industries and countries as a source of exogenous variation in product 
market regulations. The data is taken from a European Commission report by Buigues et al 
(1990).
13 This analysis is based on information contained in the 1988 Cecchini Report and 
                                                 
13 Aspects of this data have been used in various studies, including Mayes and Hart (1994), and Allen, Gasiorek 
and Smith (1998). We are not aware of any studies using the detailed industry-level data across several SMP 
countries. 
    25 
    26
                                                
other sources, including an extensive survey of businesses in the participating countries. The 
report identifies groups of 3-digit industries that were expected ex ante to be highly and 
moderately affected by the SMP, as well as the share of each of these industries in each 
country’s manufacturing employment over 1985-1987.
14 The report starts by identifying a 
common list of industries across all SMP countries, and then national experts from each 
country were asked to add or remove sectors from the list according to whether the effects of 
the SMP were expected to be large or small in each sector in their country. Thus, for example, 
a sector would be removed from the list if it was already very open to international 
competition before the implementation of the SMP. Examples of such sectors include the 
aerospace industry in the UK and the brewing and malting industry in Denmark. 
There are thus two sources of variation across SMP countries in the ex ante expected impact 
of the SMP. First, the identified 3-digit sectors make up different shares of employment 
across countries in the 2-digit industries in our sample. A limitation of the analysis is that 
some of this variation may not be exogenous with respect to the outcomes we are measuring. 
However, much of the variation reflects longstanding differences in the share of particular 
activities in countries’ manufacturing activity. Second, the fact that some sectors have been 
removed from the list at the country level creates further variation in the expected effects of 
the SMP across SMP countries. This variation stems from the fact that some countries had 
higher barriers to competition in some sectors than others at the start of the period. 
As well as variation across SMP countries, our main results also use non-SMP countries as 
controls for the impact of the SMP. This introduces a third source of variation in the data. As 
there may be concerns about the suitability of non-SMP countries as controls for what would 
have happened in the SMP countries, we test the robustness of our main results to dropping 
non-SMP countries from the sample. These robustness checks thus use only the first and 
second sources of variation described above. 
The affected sectors are grouped into four main groups. Three of these were expected to be 
highly affected. The first is a group of “high-technology public procurement sectors” 
including telecommunications equipment, office machinery and medical and surgical 
equipment. The second and third are designated as “traditional public-procurement and 
regulated markets” and are split by the degree of measured price dispersion across countries 
 
14 This information is contained in Table 26 in the Report’s statistical annex.  
prior to the SMP. The high price-dispersion group includes, amongst others, pharmaceutical 
products, and brewing and malting, while the low price dispersion group is dominated by 
shipbuilding and electrical machinery. Finally there is a fourth group of sectors that were 
expected to be moderately affected by the SMP, and which includes a range of consumer, 
investment and intermediate goods.  
We allow the estimated effects of the SMP to vary across these four groups of sectors. Table 4 
presents the average share of each 2-digit industry in our sample that fell into each of the four 
groups in 1986, the year before the beginning of our sample period. These four variables 
across countries and industries are the instruments that we use in our empirical results, and 
take the form of a step-function that rises from zero to the country-industry-specific affected 
share in 1992. The table shows that the first group of highly affected sectors are all 
concentrated in the machinery and equipment industry, while the other groups are spread 
across a range of industries. Only three of the twelve industries contain no affected sectors. In 
addition, as discussed above, non-SMP countries contain no affected sectors by definition, so 
the values of the instruments are equal to zero in all years in all industries in these countries. 
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Notes: the SMP countries in the sample are Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK. The non-SMP countries are Canada, Finland, Norway and the USA. 
Table 4: Single Market Program: average % of 2-digit industry falling into the different affected groups 
(1)   























        
Industries in SMP countries        
   15-16: Food, beverages and tobacco  0  9.1  7.4  0  83.4 
   17-19: Textiles, leather and footwear  0  0  0  62.4  37.6 
   21-22: Pulp, paper, printing and publishing  0  0  0  0  100 
   23: Coke, petroleum and nuclear fuel  0  0  0  0  100 
   24: Chemicals and chemical products  0  31.1  0  59.8  9.1 
   25: Rubber and plastics  0  0  0  26.1  73.9 
   26: Other non-metallic minerals  0  0  0  40.4  59.6 
   27: Basic metals  0  0  0  0  100 
   28: Metal products  0  6.4  0  0  93.6 
   29-33: Machinery and equipment   32.0  0  11.3  39.3  17.3 
   34: Motor vehicles  0  0  0  97.4  2.6 
   35: Other transport equipment  0  7.0  27.8  38.1  27.0 
        
All industries in non-SMP countries  0 0 0 0  100 
        
  
4.3.3  Other regulations 
While our main focus is the impact of product market reforms, the results of our previous 
study and the literature review suggest that it can be important to control for the effect of 
labour market regulations on the measured mark-up and other macroeconomic outcomes. In 
addition, labour market regulations may have an impact on rates of innovation. Predictions 
about the impact that they have depend on the type of regulation - regulations that increase 
adjustment costs, such as employment protection legislation (EPL), may slow down the 
ability of firms to respond to changes in the competitive environment (as in Caballero et al 
(2004) where EPL slows firms responsiveness to shocks); regulations that increase firms 
costs, such as benefits replacement rate and the tax wedge, may reduce investment; and 
institutions that affect the balance of bargaining power between the firm and workers, such as 
union coverage, union density and coordination, may increase or decrease innovation 
activity.
15 As we discuss later on, a full investigation of the impacts of different types of 
labour market regulation is beyond the scope of this study. However, we discuss this issue 
briefly at the end of section 5, present some results in Appendix V, and discuss the measures 
we use in more detail in Appendix III. 
We also attempt to control for the extent of financial market deregulation. Efficient financial 
markets may have an impact on competition in the product market, for example by providing 
easy access to credit for new entrants. As with labour market regulations it is possible that the 
impact of product market reforms depends on the nature of regulation in financial markets. 
Our main source of information on financial market regulation is the Fraser Institute indices 
of financial market regulation. Our attempts to investigate the role of financial market 
regulation have been hindered by the fact that there is not very much variation in the extent of 
regulation across the countries in our sample during the sample period. 
 
                                                 
15 Machin, S. and Wadhwani, S. (1991), Menezes-Filho, Ulph, and Van Reenen (1998), Ulph and Ulph (1994, 
1998, 2001); Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2003) 
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5  Empirical findings 
We now turn to our empirical findings. We start by briefly presenting results using country-
level data on the relationships between product market competition and innovative activity. 
We show that the results at the country level are sensitive to which countries are included in 
the sample. We then discuss results using country-industry level data for the manufacturing 
sector. We also show some findings on the relationship between productivity growth and the 
extent of product market competition in the service sector. We then show that the effect of 
increased product market competition on innovation is markedly different for new and 
incumbent innovators. We examine whether the impact of product market competition on 
innovation depends on a country or industry’s distance from the technological frontier. 
Finally, we discuss a number of other issues where we have had less success in identifying 
clear results. These present interesting directions for further research. 
5.1  Country-level results 
We begin by considering the relationship between different measures of innovation and our 
measure of the mark-up. We consider two different measures of innovation intensity: 
Business Enterprise R&D as a share of Gross Domestic product (BERD/GDP), and the 
number of Triadic Patent Families per capita. The results are similar for both measures.
16 We 
show that results at the country level are sensitive to the set of countries included in 
estimation. We believe that this may partly reflect differential changes in industrial 
composition across countries. We therefore focus in the next section on estimates using 
industry level data. 
Table 5 shows country-level OLS results for the two different innovation outcomes, and for 
each measure we show results for two different samples. First in columns (1) and (3) we 
include 13 OECD countries over the period 1986 to 2000. Second in columns (2) and (4) we 
use data over the same time period but drop three Scandinavian countries: Finland, Sweden 
and Denmark. In each case we also include a measure of the output-gap which varies at the 
country-year level to control for country specific fluctuations in the economic cycle, as well 
as time and country dummies.  
                                                 
16 The pattern of results is also the same if we restrict attention to industry-financed Business Enterprise R&D, 
i.e. we exclude publicly-financed R&D conducted by the business sector. 
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Considering the full sample of countries (columns (1) and (3)), we find a positive and 
significant relationship between innovation and the level of rents in the economy (a lower 
level of product market competition is associated with more innovation). However, when we 
exclude the three Scandinavian economies from the sample (columns (2) and (4)),  this 
relationship is reversed; we find that a higher level of competition (lower mark-up) is 
associated with more innovation. 
We investigated why the presence of Sweden, Finland and Denmark in the sample might be 
driving the positive relationship between the measures of innovation intensity and the mark-
up. The relationships are identified from differential changes in R&D intensity and the level 
of the mark-up across countries. Denmark, Finland and Sweden experienced the sharpest rises 
in innovation intensity from the 1990s onwards. At the same time, Denmark, Sweden and in 
particular Finland experienced rising mark-ups following a period of recession in the early 
1990s. Indeed, it may be that part of the response to the recession in these countries was a 
shift towards more R&D intensive sectors. Differences in industrial structure in Sweden and 
Finland lie in part behind their relatively high overall R&D intensity. A concern therefore is 
that differences in industrial structure across countries are at least partly causing the 
sensitivity of the results to the sample of countries used. To account for this below we use 
industry-level data for the manufacturing sector, and look at differences in innovation 
intensity within industries. As expected, we find that our industry-level results are much less 
sensitive to the composition of the sample than the country level results. 
It is also interesting that the output gap has a significant negative coefficient in the full 
sample, but not in the smaller sample. This may indicate that innovation was particularly 
cyclical in the three excluded countries. As discussed above, Sweden and Finland in particular 
experienced severe recessions in the early 1990s, followed by a recovery that coincided with 
an increase in indicators of innovation (R&D and patenting). A failure to control completely 
for these extreme cyclical variations might also help to explain why the presence of these 
countries in the sample is driving the positive coefficient on the mark-up. Industry level 
variation should also help to address this issue, since there is a significant amount of variation 
around the aggregate country cycle at the industry level. 
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Table 5: Innovation and product market competition, basic OLS results, country-level 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 BERD/GDP  BERD/GDP  Triadic  patent 
families per capita 
Triadic patent 
families per capita 











Output Gap  -0.026**  -0.002  -1.435***  -0.251 
 (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.335)  (0.196) 
        
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 189  144  189 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1), (3) contain 13 country sample. Columns (2), (4) drop 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
144 
R-squared 0.90  0.95  0.89  0.96 
 
 
We have also investigated instrumental variables results for the two different samples of 
countries (not shown), where we instrument the mark-up with country-level indicators of 
product market reforms, to generate exogenous variation. As before, the results are 
particularly sensitive to the set of countries used in estimation. For example, depending on the 
set of countries our results suggest either an upward bias on the OLS coefficient on the mark-
up (as might be expected if higher innovation intensity itself results in higher mark-ups), or a 
downwards bias.  
We revisit the instrumental variables approach in our industry-level results in the next section. 
There is more differential variation in the effects of product market reforms at the industry 
level, and our results are robust to the country composition of the sample. We also investigate 
whether the response of innovative activity to changes in product market competition depends 
on other country and/or industry characteristics, in particular the distance that an industry is 
from the technological frontier. 
5.2  Industry level analysis 
We now investigate the impact of product market reforms on R&D activity and productivity 
growth in a panel of manufacturing industries across OECD countries. We restrict the sample 
to country-industries for which we have full or almost full data on R&D, mark-ups and TFP 
growth over the period 1987-2000. In particular, we drop country-industries for which there is 
no data before 1991, as they would not allow us to identify the impact of the SMP. This 
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leaves us with 84 country-industry pairs across 9 countries, of which 5 are SMP countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK) and 4 are non-SMP countries 
(Canada, Finland, Norway and the USA). In total we have 1,122 country-industry-year 
observations. 
5.2.1  The impact of product market reforms on R&D in the manufacturing sector 
To begin with we investigate the impact of product market regulations on R&D expenditure. 
We use the mark-up as an indicator of product market competition and instrument it with our 
measures of the expected effect of the SMP across industries. This approach assumes that the 
impact of product market reforms on innovation operates through their effect on the level of 
competition, as measured by the level of rents. We also test for additional direct effects of the 
SMP variables on innovation. We discuss the interpretation of any additional direct effects 
later on. We also investigate the direct reduced form impact of the SMP variables on R&D 
and examine whether these are consistent with the impacts implied by the two-stage method. 
Table 7 shows the results with log real R&D expenditure while Table 8 shows results using 
R&D intensity. We use both to check that our results are not driven by the impact of the SMP 
on output (i.e. the denominator of R&D intensity). All specifications include a full set of 
country, industry and time dummies, so the coefficients are identified from differential 
variation over time across countries and industries. We also include a country-level measure 
of the output gap (from the OECD) to control for country-specific cyclical effects. 
Before considering those results, we first show the results from the first stage of the IV 
estimation in Table 6. Starting with column (1) we see that the SMP is associated with lower 
mark-ups and that this relationship is stronger in more highly affected sectors, though not in 
the low price-dispersion sectors (group 3). The partial R
2s and F-tests at the bottom of Table 6 
show that the instruments have explanatory power. We return to a discussion of columns (2) 
and (3) below. The output gap is significantly positive, suggesting that mark-ups are on 
average pro-cyclical. Note that the output gap is measured at the country level while the 
mark-up and all other variables are at the industry level. 
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Table 6: First stage reduced form: mark-ups and product market reforms 
Dep.  var.:  mark-up  (1) (2) (3) 
    SMP countries only   
  1987-2000 1987-2000 1988-2000 
Distance to frontier      0.042 
     (0.029) 
Output  Gap  0.005** 0.007* 0.006** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
SMP  group  1  -0.178** 0.004 -0.154** 
  (0.075) (0.081) (0.070) 
SMP  group  2  -0.301*** -0.048 -0.336*** 
  (0.071) (0.087) (0.073) 
SMP group 3  -0.043  0.412**  0.010 
  (0.122) (0.200) (0.131) 
SMP group 4  -0.113***  -0.077**  -0.109*** 
  (0.023) (0.034) (0.024) 
     
Partial R
2 of SMP groups 1-4  0.041  0.028  0.041 









2 of SMP groups 2-4  0.035     





     
Observations 1122  554  1014 
R-squared  0.49 0.41 0.50 
Notes: regression includes a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets, 
apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit industries or 
groups of industries across 9 countries over the period indicated. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 
SMP  group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
 
Turning to the results in Table 7 we find a small effect of competition (lower mark-ups) on 
R&D in column (1) in the OLS specification. Column (2) shows IV results which indicate a 
much stronger relationship between increased competition and innovation. This suggests an 
upwards bias in the OLS results, for example due to reverse causality from R&D to the mark-
up, or possibly as a result of attenuation bias. However, the Hansen J test rejects the over-
identifying restrictions (i.e. whether the SMP variables can be excluded from the R&D 
regression) in this specification. This is due to a direct negative effect of the SMP on R&D in 
Group 1 sectors, as shown in column (3). That is, the SMP group 1 variable cannot be 
excluded from the R&D regression and when it is included in the instrument set (as in column 
2), the set of instruments is found to be invalid. 
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Buigues et al (1990) say  the group 1 activities “are characterised by considerable economies 
of scale which are not always properly exploited at Community level, and by large R&D 
budgets in which the lack of cooperation between European companies constitutes a 
handicap” (p. 23). This raises the possibility that consolidation and rationalisation across 
countries in these sectors following the SMP may have reduced R&D expenditure. However, 
if R&D expenditure became more efficient this may not represent a reduction in innovation. 
Later on (Table 10, Column(7)) we find a small and marginally significant negative effect of 
the SMP on productivity growth in these sectors, which does not allow us to distinguish 
between these two interpretations. 
Column (4) shows the reduced form estimates; we see that the coefficients are roughly 
consistent with the two-stage IV results. For example, combining the coefficient of -0.113 on 
the moderately affected sectors (group 4) in column (1) of Table 6 with the coefficient of -
5.494 on the mark-up in column (3) of Table 7 suggests an indirect impact on real R&D of 
about 0.6, which is close to the direct estimated impact of 0.775 in column (4) of Table 7. 
Table 7: Log real R&D 
Dep. var.: 
Ln(R&D)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 










  (0.176) (0.753) (0.916)   
Output Gap  0.003  0.021  0.028  -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) 
SMP group 1      -2.159***  -1.451*** 
     (0.480)  (0.326) 
SMP group 2        1.088*** 
       (0.254) 
SMP group 3        0.734 
       (0.577) 
SMP group 4        0.775*** 
       (0.113) 
      







Observations  1122 1122 1122 1122 
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
brackets, apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit 
industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-2000. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 
SMP  group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
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The results for R&D intensity, shown in Table 8, are similar. We start in column (1) with 
OLS results. In column (2) we use all four SMP variables as excluded instruments. The 
Hansen J test rejects the over-identifying restrictions, and in column (3) we see that, as well as 
a direct negative effect in Group 1 sectors, we cannot exclude a direct effect of the SMP on 
R&D in Group 3 sectors - they experience an additional positive effect of the SMP on R&D 
intensity. In most of the SMP countries shipbuilding and electrical machinery dominate 
Group 3. It is possible that the additional positive impact on R&D intensity (as opposed to the 
level of R&D) in Group 3 is due to a reduction in the denominator, for example if low R&D 
firms and/or sectors exited or contracted following the SMP. As before, the estimated 
coefficient on the mark-up becomes significantly more negative in the IV specification. 
Column (4) shows the reduced form estimates (where we simply include the SMP variables 
directly in the R&D intensity equation). We discuss Column (5) below in section 4.2.3. 
Table 8: R&D intensity 
Dep. Var.: R&D/VA  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  OLS  IV  IV  Reduced Form  Reduced Form  
1988-2000 
Mark-up (industry)  -0.066***  -0.264***  -0.344***     
 (0.014)  (0.063)  (0.068)     
Distance to frontier          -0.024*** 
         (0.006) 
Output Gap  0.000  0.001  0.002  -0.000  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
SMP group 1      -0.206***  -0.135***  -0.086** 
     (0.040)  (0.043)  (0.036) 
SMP group 2        0.133***  0.121*** 
       (0.020)  (0.019) 
SMP group 3      0.196**  0.204**  0.046 
     (0.076)  (0.100)  (0.082) 
SMP group 4        0.031***  0.017* 
       (0.011)  (0.010) 








2 of SMP 
variables 
     0.033 
F-test of SMP 
variables (p-value) 
     18.72 
(0.000) 
Observations 1122  1122  1122  1122  1014 
R-squared 0.65      0.66  0.66 
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
brackets, apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit 
industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-2000. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion)  
SMP  group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
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What do these results imply about the economic magnitude of our estimated effects? The 
coefficient on the mark-up in column (3) of Table 8 suggests that a one percentage point fall 
in the mark-up is associated with on average about a 0.3 percentage point increase in R&D 
intensity. Consider the impact of the SMP on the chemicals industry in the UK, for example. 
30% of the industry fell into Group 2 of highly affected sectors, while a further 39% of the 
industry fell into Group 4 of moderately affected sectors. Combining these numbers with the 
coefficients on the SMP variables in column (1) of Table 6 our estimates predict that the SMP 
was associated with a 13 percentage point fall in the chemical industry’s average mark-up. 
Combining this with the coefficient on the mark-up in column (3) of Table 8 suggests that the 
SMP was associated with a rise in R&D intensity of 4.6 percentage points. We can compare 
this to reduced form coefficients on the SMP variables in column (4) of Table 8, which 
generate a predicted rise in R&D intensity of 5.2 percentage points. The actual average pre- 
and post-SMP R&D intensities in the chemical sector over the sample period were 14.3% and 
19.2% respectively, a rise of 4.9 percentage points. Thus, while many other factors may have 
affected R&D intensity in this industry in the UK over the period, both our IV and reduced 
form estimates suggest that in the absence of the SMP it would have remained fairly constant. 
5.2.2  Robustness to using only SMP countries 
The results above use non-SMP countries as controls, as well as variation in the effects of the 
SMP between industries in the SMP countries. In Table 9 we show equivalent results using 
only the SMP countries, thus using only the latter form of variation. One main difference in 
these results is in the first stage IV results, shown in column (2) of Table 6. We find no 
significant effect on the mark-up from the first two highly affected groups, and a positive 
from the third highly-affected group, which is dominated by shipbuilding and electrical 
machinery. However, a strong negative impact from moderately affected sectors provides 
most of the explanatory power. The main point here is that, although less precisely estimated, 
in the R&D results (Table 9) the coefficient on the instrumented mark-up term is similar to 





Table 9: Log real R&D, SMP countries only 
Dep.  var.:  Ln(R&D)  (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS  IV  Reduced  Form 
Mark-up (industry)  -0.402**  -3.670**   
 (0.181)  (1.100)   
Output Gap  0.005  0.025  -0.002 
  (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) 
SMP group 1      -0.057 
     (0.292) 
SMP group 2      0.010 
     (0.256) 
SMP group 3      -2.310*** 
     (0.429) 
SMP group 4      0.117 
     (0.101) 
      





Observations  554 554 554 
      
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
brackets, apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit 
industries or groups of industries across 5 SMP countries over the period 1987-2000. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 
SMP  group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
 
5.2.3  The impact of product market reforms on productivity growth 
We now consider the effect of product market reforms on productivity growth through their 
effect on R&D, as in equation (2), and consider whether there is evidence for a direct effect 
on productivity growth. The sample is slightly smaller than above because we lose the first 
year of data – the right hand side variables are all lagged by one period. 
In columns (1) and (3) of Table 10 we find a positive association between R&D and TFP 
growth and in columns (2) and (3) between competition (lower mark-up) and TFP growth. 
We also include a measure of the industries’ distance to the technological frontier and find 
that industries that are further from the frontier experience faster TFP growth. This is 
consistent with productivity convergence, for example if industries further behind the frontier 
are more able to benefit from imitation and adoption of technologies developed near to the 
frontier. We discuss further results incorporating measures of distance to the frontier in 
section 5.4 below. 
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Table 10: TFP growth 
Dep Var.: TFP 
growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS OLS OLS  IV  IV  IV  Reduced  form 
R&D/VA  0.115***   0.079*  0.481**   0.621***  
  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.215)  (0.238)  
Mark-up (industry)    -0.063***  -0.057***    -0.052  0.065   
   (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.068)  (0.070)  
Distance  to  frontier  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.034*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
Output gap  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SMP  group  1         -0.057* 
         ( 0 . 0 3 3 )
( 0 . 0 4 3 )
( 0 . 0 6 1 )
( 0 . 0 1 1 )
 
SMP  group  2         0.059 
          
SMP  group  3         -0.002 
          
SMP  group  4         0.002 
          
         
         
Hansen J test  of 
over-id. (p-value) 







Observations  1014 1014 1014 1014 1014 1014 1014 
R-squared 0.23  0.25  0.25        0.23 
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. All right hand side variables are lagged one period. Robust standard errors in brackets, 
apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-
2000. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 
SMP  group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
  
In columns (4) to (6) we instrument both variables (the mark-up and R&D intensity) with the 
impact of the SMP (the reduced form regression for the mark-up is shown in column (3) of 
Table 6 and for R&D intensity in column (5) of Table 8). Column (7) presents the estimated 
reduced form impact of the instruments on TFP growth. The IV estimates of the impact of 
R&D on TFP growth (columns (4) and (6)) are larger than the OLS estimates, while the IV 
estimates of the impact of the mark-up are not significant. Overall, the results in Table 10 
suggest that we do not find evidence of a direct effect of competition on productivity growth, 
but that there is an indirect effect through R&D. 
As before, we find similar results using only SMP countries (see Appendix V), though we 
cannot identify any significant effects when we instrument both R&D and the mark-up in 
column (6). Note that the direct impact of the SMP variables on TFP growth in the reduced 
form in column (7) is not jointly significant in either the full sample or the SMP-only sample. 
Thus we do not find strong evidence of a direct impact of the SMP on TFP growth over this 
period, beyond any indirect effect through the effect on R&D.  
What is the economic magnitude of these effects? The coefficient on R&D intensity in 
columns (4) and (6) of Table 10 suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in R&D intensity 
is associated with about a 0.5 or 0.6 percentage point increase in TFP growth. As an example, 
this is similar to the predicted impact of the SMP on the metal products industry in the UK: 
7.5% of the industry fell into Group 2 of highly affected sectors, and the coefficient on SMP 
Group 2 in column (5) of Table 8 is 0.121, suggesting that the SMP program was associated 
with a 0.9 percentage point increase in R&D intensity in the industry as a whole. This in turn 
was associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in TFP growth.
17 The actual increase in 
TFP growth in the metal products industry was 1.7 percentage points, from 2.5% to 4.2%, so 





                                                 
17 This is 0.9 times the coefficient on R&D intensity in column (4) of Table 10 of 0.481. 
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5.2.4  Service sector industries 
In contrast to manufacturing, for service sectors we lack both good direct measures of 
innovation across countries and good instruments for the mark-up. We instead look at the 
direct impact of product market competition on productivity growth in a panel of service 
industries. Productivity growth could be seen as a proxy for innovation in these sectors. 
For the service sectors we are able to use a panel of 5 market service industries across 
countries covering the following sectors: wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants, transport 
and storage, financial intermediation and business services. All regressions include country, 
industry and year dummies. We exclude the network industries, which include post, telecoms, 
electricity, water and gas. We examine both labour productivity growth and TFP growth, due 
to the well-known difficulties in measuring capital stocks in service sectors.  
The OLS results suggest that competition increases productivity growth in these service 
sectors, (wholesale and retail, hotels and restaurants, transport and storage, financial 
intermediation and business services), as shown in Table 11. The impact of the mark-up on 
TFP growth in column (2) is smaller than in the equivalent specification for manufacturing in 
column (2) of Table 10, but without good instruments it is not possible to say much more, in 
particular whether the effect is causal or merely an association. Identifying the impact of 
deregulation and product market reforms on innovation in service sectors would be a very 
interesting area for future research. 
Table 11: Productivity growth and product market competition in the service sector, 
basic OLS, industry-level 
 (1) 
Labour productivity growth 
(2) 
TFP growth 
    
Mark-up  -0.026** -0.039*** 
 (0.011)  (0.021) 
Distance to frontier  0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005)  (0.004) 
Output gap  -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
    
Observations 792  792 
R-squared 0.16  0.19 
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include industry, time and country dummies. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The sample consists of a panel of 5 
broad service sectors across13 OECD countries over 1987-2001. All right-hand-side variables are lagged by 
one year. 
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5.3  Is the impact on incumbents and/or entrants? 
In this section we investigate whether increased product market competition has a differential 
effect on innovation among new and incumbent innovators. We find that the positive 
relationship between product market competition on innovation is driven by the response of 
incumbent innovators to competition. This accords with our theoretical expectations as 
discussed in Section 2.  
We consider the following relationship: 
ijt i t j it it ijt e X P + + + + + + = η τ λ γ βμ α
'  
where i indexes countries, j indexes technology class, t indexes years, P is the number of 
patents, μ  is the markup (level of rents) as discussed above, X are other control variables (the 
output gap),  i η  captures country specific unobservables,  j λ  captures technology specific 
unobservables (through 115 technology dummies),  t τ  captures common macro shocks, and 
 captures idiosyncratic shocks. We estimate this in aggregate, and also consider the process 
separately for entrants and incumbents,   and  , respectively. We discuss below how we 






As above, a concern about OLS estimates of this relationship is that rents are potentially 
endogenous, due to shocks that affect rents and technology opportunities simultaneously, or to 
reverse causality from patenting to rents. We instrument rents with the indicators of product 
market reforms discussed above. 
We use data on individual patents taken out at the European Patent Office (EPO). Patents 
indicate the country of the assignee (the owner of the patent) and the country of residence of 
all inventors. We use the country of the inventor(s) to allocate patents to locations. Where 
there is more than one inventor the share of each inventor is allocated to respective countries 
(if there are three inventors then each inventor is allocated a third). We use the priority date to 
allocate the patent to a particular year.
18
                                                 
18 If that is not available we use the application date, and where that is not available we use the grant date (and 
assume that the application was made three years earlier than it was granted). 
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We distinguish patents taken out by incumbents from those taken out by entrants. An 
incumbent is defined as an assignee that took out at least one patent more than 12 months 
previously, entrants are those assignees which did not have any patents prior to 12 months 
previously.
19 As a dependent variable we use the count of patents scaled by the population of 
the country in thousands. Table 12 shows descriptive statistics. 
Table 12: Mean and (standard deviation) of dependent variables 
Country  Patents per 1000  Entrant patents per 1000  Incumbent patents per 1000 
Australia 0.60 0.36 0.24 
       (0.76) (0.42) (0.41) 
Belgium 1.46  0.40  1.06 
       (1.83) (0.45) (1.60) 
Canada 0.48  0.23  0.24 
       (0.69) (0.33) (0.41) 
Denmark 2.38 1.01 1.37 
       (3.17) (1.10) (2.37) 
France 0.94  0.30  0.64 
       (1.53) (0.44) (1.16) 
Great Britain  0.78  0.26  0.53 
       (1.32) (0.37) (1.01) 
Italy 0.48  0.22  0.26 
       (0.72) (0.29) (0.46) 
Netherlands 1.66  0.41  1.25 
       (2.34) (0.55) (2.04) 
Norway 1.84  1.08  0.75 
       (1.50) (0.87) (0.87) 
USA 0.75  0.19  0.56 
       (1.59) (0.38) (1.24) 
            
Total 0.95  0.33  0.63 
       (1.65) (0.51) (1.29) 
Notes: Sample includes information on 115 technology classes (IPCs) in ten countries. 
Table 13 considers the impact of product market competition on innovative activity. The 
dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is the count of all patent applications made in 
each year in each country-technology class, scaled by the population of the country. Country 
and technology class effects control for a host of other non-time varying factors including 
other institutions and differences in national measurement systems. Year effects control for 
common macro economic trends. The output gap measure captures country specific cyclical 
effects and is measured as the deviation from trend growth. 
                                                 
19 Some assignees might be co-owned, so we may be considering some assignees to be entrants when actually 
they are incumbents. We are in the process of matching the patents data to firm level data to control for this. We 
have also tried using 24 and 36 months as a definition of entry and the results were substantially similar.  
Column (1) shows that the level of rents in the whole economy is not informative in 
explaining variation in patenting activity within country-technology classes. Most economic 
activity is in services, while most patenting activity is in manufacturing. This means that there 
may be a mismatch in using the level of rents in the whole economy to proxy competitive 
conditions. In addition, it may be more difficult to measure prices, and thus rents, in many 
non-traded sectors. In column 2 we use the measure of rents in the manufacturing sector. This 
is more informative, and suggests that more competition (a lower mark-up) is associated with 
more patenting activity. 
A major concern with the OLS estimates shown in columns (1) and (2) is that the level of 
rents is endogenous. This could lead to spurious correlation between patenting and the level of 
rents. As before we use policy reforms undertaken by different countries at different times 
over the past two decades to give us exogenous variation in the extent of competition, and use 
these as instruments. 
In columns (3), (5) and (8) we use three excluded variables as instruments for the mark-up – 
the impact of the single market programme, the administrative burden on business and the 
ease of starting a new business. The partial R² of the excluded instruments is 0.2485 and an F-
test of the joint significance has P-value of 0.000. In column (6) ease of starting a new 
business is not used as an instrument, since in column (5) the Hansen J-test rejects the 
exclusion restrictions. In this case the partial R² is 0.2475, and the P-value of the F-test is 
0.000. These indicate that the instruments have some power in explaining variation in rents. 
In column (3) the coefficient on rents increases in absolute magnitude, from -1.5 to -2.1, 
suggesting that there is upward bias in the OLS regressions. This makes sense, both from an 
economic point of view and possibly reflecting measurement error (which would lead to 
attenuation bias towards zero).
20
                                                 
20 If we include the control function (the residual from the first stage) in the regressions in Table 1 (not shown) 
this suggests that endogeneity is a concern (see Wooldridge (2002)). Controlling for endogeneity has an effect on 
the estimates and suggests substantial positive bias. 
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Table 13: Impact of competition on patenting per 1000 population 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All  All  All  Entrants  Entrants Entrants  Incumbents  Incumbents 
     GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Rents 
(whole economy)  -0.352 
       
  (0.274)         
Rents 
(manufacturing)    -1.480*** -2.149*** -0.354***   -0.096  -0.064  -1.126***  -2.117*** 
    (0.291) (0.514) (0.070) (0.144) (0.145) (0.201) (0.430) 
           
Country  effects  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year  effects  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Technology  effects  yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hansen J test  
(p-value) 








Observations 13781  13781 13781 13781 13781 13781 13781 13781 
Notes: output gap, country, year, 115 technology dummies included in all regressions; standard errors are robust; instruments in columns (3) (5) and (8) are single market 
programme, administrative burden on business and ease of starting a new business; in column (6) ease of starting a new business is not used as an instrument *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  
In columns (4) - (8) we split the patents data into patents taken out by new entrants (assignees 
that have patented for the first time in the past 12 months) and incumbents (assignees that 
have already patented more than 12 months ago), and aggregate these separately to the 
country-year-technology class level. We see that the impact of increased competition is 
negligible for entrants, but substantially larger for incumbent patenters. This is in line with the 
theoretical ideas discussed above – increased competition leads incumbents to innovate to 
escape competition, but may deter entrants.  
In Appendix V we also control for labour market institutions (Table V.4). When we do this 
we see that the impact of increased competition (reduced mark-up) for entrants is to decrease 
innovation. This accords with theory - entrants incentives are driven by the level of rents 
available (they are comparing no rents with positive rents from entering the market), when 
competition increases, these rents decrease. In contrast, controlling for labour market 
institutions does not have the same impact on the mark-up coefficient for incumbents. Again, 
this accords with theory - incumbents already operate in the market, increased competition 
drives down both their pre and post innovation rents. Whether increased competition provides 
incentives to innovate will depend on which is affected more. The estimates in Table V.4 
suggest that the net effect is to encourage innovation. 
5.4  Distance to the technological frontier 
As discussed in Section 2, recent theoretical models predict that the innovative behaviour of 
firms (industries or countries) will vary with their distance to the technological frontier. We 
explore whether innovative activity varies with distance to the frontier. At the country level 
we measure distance to the technological frontier as the difference in total factor productivity 
between each country and the technological leader in each year (the country with the highest 
TFP, which is always the US in our sample). An equivalent measure is calculated for each 
industry in each country relating TFP to TFP in the country that is the technological leader in 
that industry. When we look at patents we use measures at the country level, because we are 
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not able to attribute patents to industries.
21 Table 14 shows the mean distance to the frontier 
by country and industry-country, and the standard deviation over years. 
Table 14: Distance to the frontier 
 Country  level   
distance to frontier 
(standard deviation) 
Industry-country level 














































In Table 15 we investigate whether the impact of product market competition on patenting 
activity varies with distance to the frontier. The first two columns use all patents, columns (3) 
and (4) consider patents by new entrants and columns (5) and (6) patents by incumbent firms. 
Columns (2), (4) and (6) show GMM estimates, with instruments indicated in the notes to the 
Table. 
The level of distance to frontier enters negatively in all cases, and is significant in all GMM 
specifications.
22 Countries patent less the further they are from the technological frontier. This 
is not surprising given that patents represent frontier innovation. The impact of competition is 
positive and significant in all GMM specification - a lower level of rents leads to greater 
                                                 
21 Patents are categories by technology class. In ongoing work we are matching these patents to firm accounting 
data, which will help us to identify which industries the patents are used in. 
22 We have treated distance to frontier as exogenous. 
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patenting activity. The interaction term is positive, suggesting that in industries that are far 
from the frontier the impact of increasing competition is muted. 
 
 
Table 15: Patents per 1000 population, distance to the frontier and its interaction with 
competition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All  All  Entrants  Entrants Incumbents  Incumbents 
   GMM  GMM  GMM 
Rents 
(manufacturing)  -1.217*** -2.253*** -0.273*** -0.932*** -0.944*** -1.537*** 
  (0.261) (0.627) (0.095) (0.197) (0.288) (0.507) 
DTF -1.420*  -6.676**  -0.365  -3.894*** -1.055  -4.684** 
  (0.768) (2.250) (0.357) (0.916) (0.822) (1.831) 
DTF * Rents  1.367***  5.954**  0.303  3.973***  1.064  4.119** 
  (0.404) (2.059) (0.217) (0.879) (0.709) (1.679) 
        
        
Country  effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year  effects  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Technology 
effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Hansen J test 
(p-value) 




    5.577 
(0.233) 
Observations  10370 10370 10370 10370 10370 10370 
Notes: output gap, country, year, 115 technology dummies included in all regressions; standard errors are 
robust; instruments in columns (2) and (6) are single market programme, administrative burden on business and 
ease of starting a new business; in column (4) ease of starting a new business is not used as an instrument. *, ** 
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
One cause for concern is that the Hansen J test in column (4) rejects the overidentifying 
restrictions, so the results should be treated with caution. We have not been able to find a set 
of instruments that are accepted by the model, and more work is needed on this. 
The mean distance to frontier in our sample is 0.42. At that level the impact of increasing 
competition is zero or even detrimental to patenting.
23 It is only in those countries that are 
relatively close to the technological frontier (in our sample these are Canada, Denmark, 
France, Great Britain and the US) that increased competition has a positive impact on 
patenting activity. 
                                                 
23 In column (2) it is -2.253 + 5.954*0.42 = 0.248, in column (4) it is -0.932 + 3.973*0.42 = 0.737, in column (6) 
-1.537 + 4.119*0.42 = 0.193. 
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We can also look at the relation between R&D expenditure in manufacturing and distance to 
the technological frontier, now measured at the industry level. In Table 16 all right hand side 
variables, including distance to the frontier, are lagged by one period. As above, we find that 
country-industries that are further from the technological frontier invest less in R&D, and that 
competition has less effect the further you are from the frontier (Table 16, Column (3)). 
Indeed, given the maximum value of our distance to frontier measure (of around 2), these 
results suggest very little effect of competition at all for country-industries furthest behind the 
frontier. One concern is that these results do not hold for R&D intensity (see Appendix V), 
and again, this merits further investigation. 
Table 16: Log real R&D, distance to the frontier and its interaction with competition 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  OLS  OLS  IV with interactions in 
the instrument set 
Mark-up t-1 -0.481*** -0.393* -7.030*** 
 (0.172)  (0.220)  (1.485) 
Distance to Frontier t-1 -0.118 0.044  -3.018* 
 (0.092)  (0.282)  (1.617) 
Mark-up t-1 * DTF t-1  -0.145  2.735* 
   (0.234)  (1.410) 
Output Gap t-1 0.003 0.003  0.033* 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.019) 
SMP Group 1 t-1    -1.790*** 
     (0.475) 
      
Partial R2 of excl. 
instruments 
   0.036 
Partial R2 (interaction)      0.044 
F-test of excl. 
instruments. (p-value) 




   10.48 
(0.000) 
Hansen J test  of over-id. 
(p-value) 
   1.28 
(0.866) 
Observations 1122  1122  1122 
R-squared 0.89  0.89   
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
brackets, apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit 
industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-2000. Instruments in column (3) 
include  the impacts of the SMP on Groups 2, 3 and 4, and their interactions with distance to frontier. *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 
SMP  group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
These results are broadly consistent with those in ABGHP – increasing competition has the 
greatest impact in countries in industries that are near the technological frontier and thus have 
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incentives to react to increased competitive pressure by innovating. However, that model 
focuses on incentives to invest in new innovations. In these countries/industries that are 
further from the frontier a large part of the response to competition may be through activity 
that does not contribute to formal R&D or patenting. This may help explain why we find a 
larger effect closer to the frontier. The dependent variables (patents and R&D) may not 
capture innovation and imitation activity very well in countries and/or industries that are 
further from the frontier. Estimating the balance between these two explanations would only 
be possible with better measures of imitation activity across countries than are available at 
present. 
5.5  Other issues  
In this section we discuss a range of issues on which we do not have conclusive results. Many 
of these issues represent interesting avenues for further research. 
5.5.1  Non-linearities in the effect of competition 
We have investigated whether the impact of competition on innovation is non-linear. For 
example, in a specification similar to column (3) of Tables 7 or 8 we included the square of 
the mark-up as an extra regressor and instrumented it with the SMP variables in a similar way 
to the linear term. There was no robust evidence of a non-linear effect. This was true for 
various different specifications and instrumenting strategies. 
One possibility is that we do not have sufficient variation in the SMP variables across the full 
range of values of the mark-up to identify a non-linear effect. Studies that have robustly 
identified a non-linear effect of competition on innovation, such as Aghion et al (2005a), have 
used a larger number of instruments than we have available across countries. Thus, while we 
cannot rule out a non-linear effect of competition on innovation, we do not find robust 
evidence for it in our data. 
5.5.2  Credit market regulations 
As discussed in Section 4.3.3 we have not had much success in exploring the impact of credit 
market regulations on innovative behaviour. We believe that this is because we are not able to 
capture much variation at the country level in the working of financial markets. All of the 
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countries in our sample have fairly well developed financial markets and legal systems. The 
papers in the literature that have looked at the impact of financial market regulations across 
countries have largely identified this effect by comparing developed and developing countries 
(or emerging countries).
 24
5.5.3  Labour market regulations 
In Appendix V we present some results investigating the impact of labour market regulations 
on innovation, using both R&D and patents. There are a large number of ways in which 
different aspects of labour market regulation could affect innovation, as well as affecting the 
impact of product market reforms. For example, the results in the Appendix suggest that while 
some aspects of labour market regulation may reduce innovation (such as employment 
protection legislation) others appear to increase it (such as union density and bargaining 
coverage). However, the addition of the labour market regulation measures does not change 
the main estimated relationships between competition and innovation. 
We consider that a full treatment of this issue would require much more detailed investigation 
that is beyond the scope of this study. In addition, for our industry level results it would be 
desirable to use variation in characteristics such union density at the industry level, which 
would require a considerable data collection exercise. However, the important point for the 
present study is that the addition of the labour market regulation measures does not change the 
main estimated relationships between competition and innovation. 
5.5.4  Sequencing of reforms 
A potentially interesting extension would be to examine the impact of the sequencing of 
reforms. For example, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue that product market reforms may 
improve the political economy of reforms to the labour market by reducing the amount of 
rents that workers are able to capture. However, examining these dynamics is beyond the 
scope of this study, especially given the relatively short time period available.
25 This is 
another interesting potential topic for further research, although the most that would be 
                                                 
24 See recent review in Levine (2004). 
25 The relatively short time period of data available to us also prevents thorough examination of lagged or 
delayed responses to product market reforms. 
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possible without more detailed data would be to examine how the impact of one type of 
reform depends on the average (or beginning-of-period) level of another type of regulation. 
    52 
6  Summary and conclusions 
Taken overall, the results presented in this report show that  product market reforms affect the 
extent to which firms can charge prices above costs (the mark-up) and that this has an impact 
on innovative activity, which in turn affects total factor productivity growth. In general, the 
nature of the relationships that we estimate accord strongly with economic theory.  
Our specific findings are that product market reforms, and in particular the Single Market 
Programme, had statistically and economically significant effects on the extent of 
competition, as measured by the mark-up of prices over average costs. The subsequent 
increase in competition led to changes in innovative activity and total factor productivity 
growth that were consistent with theoretical models.  
Our main findings suggest the following: 
•  The product market reforms that were associated with the Single Market Programme 
lead to a reduction in the average mark-up, i.e. an increase in product market 
competition, in affected countries and industries. 
•  Increased competition (as measured by the mark-up) lead to increased R&D 
investment in manufacturing industries. 
•  The Single Market Programme may have had an additional direct negative impact on 
R&D expenditure in some high-tech manufacturing industries. However, it is not clear 
whether this actually represented a reduction in innovative outputs or an increase in 
the efficiency of R&D spending in these industries across EU countries. 
•  Competition increased innovative activity by incumbents, but if anything it decreased 
incentives for new firms to enter into the innovation process. This is consistent with 
theory which suggests that increased competition reduces the potential rewards to 
innovation for entrants, but may increase it for incumbents if it reduces pre-innovation 
rents by more than post-innovation rents. 
•  There is some indication that, within an industry, the effect of increasing competition 
on innovation is larger in countries that are closer to the global technological frontier. 
However, this result may also reflect the fact that a higher proportion of innovative 
activity is measured as formal R&D or patents in countries that are more 
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technologically advanced. Without better data on imitation activity than exists at 
present it is very difficult to distinguish between these two effects. 
•  Increased R&D investment lead to faster total factor productivity growth in 
manufacturing industries. 
•  There is some indication that competition (as measured by the mark-up) is associated 
with faster productivity growth in the service sector, but this result should be seen as 
an association rather than a causal relationship. Given their importance in modern 
economies, the impact of competition on innovation in service sectors represents an 
interesting avenue for further research. 
•  The effect of labour market regulations on innovation and productivity growth is 
complex and a detailed examination is beyond the scope of this study. However, the 
above results are robust to controlling for the direct effects of a range of labour market 
regulations on innovation. 
Finally, it is important to note that a range of other factors is likely to have affected innovative 
activity and productivity growth over the period we have considered. These include human 
capital, infrastructure (broadly defined), and a range of other institutional factors. Reforms to 
product markets are unlikely to have been the most important determinant. In addition, while 
we have attempted to investigate the extent to which the impact of product market reforms 
varies with a number of other factors, we have not been able to draw robust conclusions about 
a number of potential interactions. In particular, the role of credit and labour market 
regulations in determining the impact of reforms to product markets would be an interesting 
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7   Literature review 
What does the theoretical and empirical literature tell us about how product market 
regulations and reforms affect innovation outcomes and macro-economic performance? 
Product market regulations and reforms are generally not explicitly included in models of 
innovation or growth. What is usually modeled is the degree of competition in a market or the 
ease of entry, captured by parameters such as the number of firms in the market, the extent of 
entry barriers, the degree of differentiation between products, the strength of consumers’ 
preferences for a product or the conduct of firms in the market. We interpret product market 
reforms as policy reforms that lead to a change in competition in the product market or a 
change in the market entry conditions that firms face. We focus on the literature that relates 
the degree of product market competition to innovation outcomes. In a previous report for the 
European Commission, Cincera and Galgau (2005) survey the literature on entry. There are a 
large number of other literatures that may also be relevant to our study. While it is not 
possible to review all of this material, we will draw on it in our study where relevant. We start 
by reviewing the theoretical literature and then consider the empirical literature. 
In summary, our review highlights the following points: 
•  There is little disagreement over the fact that market power leads to allocative 
inefficiency - prices do not reflect costs and therefore goods are not allocated 
optimally. 
•  There is little disagreement that competition promotes productive efficiency.  
•  The question is: can these same effects also capture the impact of competition on 
innovation and growth? 
•  Specific product market reforms affect competition and innovation in different ways, 
depending on the nature of the reform and the characteristics of the firm, industry or 
country in question.  
•  Entry can be an indicator of both and innovative outcome (particularly in service 
sectors), but simple counts of entry do not provide a very accurate indication of either. 
•  The theoretical literature linking competition to innovation does not give clear 
predictions about the direction of the relationship - different theories point in opposite 
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directions, and some theories allow for opposite effects for different parameter values 
within the same model. 
•  One key feature of many theoretical models is that competition reduces firms’ 
incentives to innovate, because it reduces the level of profits available to firms. 
•  On the other hand, incumbent firms may face the threat of losing more in a race than 
entrants, and may therefore have a greater incentive to innovate in order to escape the 
competition that would follow entry. 
•  Competition and entry lead to allocative and productive efficiency and encourage the 
adoption of best practice. 
•  The empirical literature, on the whole, points to a positive effect of competition on 
innovation. There are, however, a number of difficult empirical challenges, which are 
not adequately addressed in much of the literature. 
•  There is some empirical evidence that the impact of competition on innovation varies 
with characteristics of the firm or industry – for example the degree to which firms 
have similar costs, and distance from the technological frontier, and other aspects of 
the economic environment, such as other regulation (e.g. in labour and credit markets). 
7.1  Theoretical literature 
In this section we discuss theoretical models that consider the relationship between the extent 
of product market competition and innovation and imitation (technological diffusion). First, it 
is worth outlining some concepts. Innovation relates to activity that is devoted to the research 
and development of either a product that is new to the market or a new process innovation 
which reduces the costs of producing a good or service. Innovative activity is an inherently 
risky process and will not always lead to a new product or process. When an innovation is 
introduced commercially it can be considered either incremental or drastic. Both incremental 
and drastic innovations are welfare improving (consumer plus producer surplus increases), but  
a drastic innovation is one that produces such an increase in welfare that, even if the innovator 
becomes a monopolist consumer surplus will still increase. 
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Imitation or technological diffusion is the adoption of existing products, production 
technologies or organizational best practice developed in new firms or environments. 
Typically the most advanced firms or economies engage in innovation (frontier research), 
whereas those firms and economies further away from the technological frontier benefit from 
imitation, though may also innovate themselves. Imitation may itself require some 
technological know how or absorptive capacity. 
We will consider the impact of competition on all of these types of innovative activity, 
although as we will see in the empirical work, it is often difficult to distinguish between them 
in practice. 
7.1.1  Models of product differentiation and price competition 
A standard way to model imperfect competition is by allowing products within a market to be 
differentiated from each other. Firms derive market power by having a product that is located 
near to a greater number of consumers (location can either be in geographic space or in 
product characteristics space). The degree of competition is measured by the extent to which 
consumers see products as substitutes for each other, or have preference for one product over 
others. There are a variety of models of firm behaviour in differentiated product markets. The 
most well known models of price competition and product differentiation are the Hotelling 
linear model, the circular version of that model by Salop (1977) and the symmetric model of 
monopolistic competition by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). These all deliver the prediction that 
more intense product market competition reduces the rents of those firms that successfully 
enter the market, and therefore it discourages firms from entering, or innovating, in the first 
place. This is what is often called the "Schumpeterian effect" of product market competition 
on innovation.  
7.1.2  The rent dissipation effect 
An alternative way to look at the question of how competition affects innovation is to 
consider an incumbent firm engaged in a race with a potential entrant for a new innovation 
that will reduce costs. Who will invest more R&D resources in the race, the incumbent or the 
potential entrant? The answer turns out to be ambiguous, and relies on the trade-off between 
two opposite effects: a rent dissipation effect and a replacement effect. The replacement effect 
(Arrow, 1962) refers to the fact that, by innovating, the incumbent monopolist replaces her 
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own rents, whereas the potential entrant has no pre-existing rents to replace. Everything else 
remaining equal, this effect will induce the entrant to invest more in the race than the 
incumbent firm. On the other hand, the rent dissipation effect refers to the fact that the 
incumbent may lose more by letting the entrant win the race (she dissipates the difference 
between her current monopoly rents and the duopoly rents if the entrant innovates) than the 
potential entrant does by letting the incumbent win the race (he loses the difference between 
what may be at best duopoly rents if he had won the race and zero if the incumbent wins). The 
rent dissipation effect may or may not counteract the replacement effect. If it does, then the 
incumbent ends up investing more in the race than the potential entrant. 
The Industrial Organisation literature emphasizes the comparison between monopoly and 
duopoly profits, and the fact that when competition generates enough rent dissipation (reduces 
duopoly profits sufficiently), then the difference between monopoly and duopoly profits is 
much greater than duopoly profits themselves, so that the incumbent is more likely to win the 
race and thereby persist as monopoly. 
7.1.3  The importance of vertical differentiation 
Aghion and Schankerman (2004) show that more intense product market competition can 
enhance "innovations" through several channels that counteract the negative effect pointed out 
above, if we suppose that some firms have higher unit costs than others, so that firms are not 
only horizontally differentiated, but they are also vertically differentiated by their costs. First, 
by increasing the market share of low-cost firms at the expense of high-cost firms, more 
intense competition may end up encouraging entry by low-cost firms (especially if potential 
low-cost entrants are far less numerous than high-cost entrants). Second, and again because it 
increases the market share of low-cost firms relative to high-cost firms, more intense 
competition will induce high-cost firms to invest in "restructuring" in order to become low-
cost firms themselves. Note that such an investment amounts to a quality-improving 
innovation and allows the high-cost firm to suffer less from more intense competition.  
7.1.4  Agency cost literature 
Many models formalize the "Darwinian" effect of competition. In Hart (1983) competition 
increases productivity by acting as an incentive scheme to ensure that managers (and workers) 
do not buy themselves a "quiet life" (i.e. slack or consume leisure on the job). Hart (1983) 
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models "satisficing" managers who seek a quiet life, subject to survival. This has been 
incorporated into growth models, where we see the conditions under which competition, 
combined with the threat of bankruptcy, can force managers to innovate and thereby achieve a 
higher rate of growth. Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey (1999) embed the agency model of Hart in an 
endogenous growth framework and show that competition should also have a positive effect 
on innovation and growth, by reducing managerial slack and forcing managers to respond 
more promptly to cost reductions by other firms. In addition, they show that competition and 
a hard budget constraint are complementary.  
Schmidt (1997) derives a model in which the optimal incentive scheme is a function of the 
degree of product market competition. An increase in competition leads to a reduction in firms’ 
profits. This has two effects. First, the probability of liquidation goes up giving managers 
incentives to work harder. Secondly, the reduction in profits may change the profitability of a cost 
reducing activity. This can lead to either a reduction or an increase in managers incentives 
depending on the direction of change. 
7.1.5  The endogenous growth paradigm 
The prediction that product market competition has an unambiguously negative effect on 
entry or innovation is shared by the models of endogenous technical change in Growth 
Theory.
26 In all of these models, an increase in product market competition has a negative 
effect on productivity growth by reducing the monopoly rents that reward new innovation. An 
increase in the ability of other firms in the industry to imitate has a similar effect. This 
discourages firms from engaging in R&D activities, thereby lowering the innovation rate and 
therefore also the rate of long-run growth, which in these models is proportional to the 
innovation rate. In the product variety framework of Romer (1990) this property is directly 
inherited from the Dixit-Stiglitz model upon which this model is built. But the same effect is 
also at work in the Schumpeterian (or quality-ladder) models of Aghion-Howitt (1992) and 
Grossman-Helpman (1991), which both predict that competition policy is unambiguously 
detrimental to growth, increased product market competition discourage innovation and 
growth by reducing the payoff incumbent innovators can obtain.  
                                                 
26 For example, Romer (1990), Aghion-Howitt (1992), Grossman-Helpman (1991). 
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7.1.6  Recent developments in endogenous growth literature 
Recent endogenous growth models extend the basic Schumpeterian model by allowing 
incumbent firms to innovate.
27 In this framework firms innovate in order to reduce production 
costs, and they do it “step-by-step”, in the sense that a laggard firm in any industry must first 
catch up with the technological leader before becoming itself a leader in the future. 
In these models, innovation incentives depend on the difference between post-innovation and 
pre-innovation rents (the latter were equal to zero in the basic model where all innovations 
were made by outsiders). More product market competition may foster innovation and 
growth, as it may reduce a firm's pre-innovation rents by more than it reduces its post-
innovation rents. In other words, competition may increase the incremental profits from 
innovating, and thereby encourage R&D investments aimed at “escaping competition”.  
This should be particularly true in sectors where incumbent firms are operating at similar 
technological levels, that is in industries in which oligopolistic firms face more similar 
production costs. The firm with lower unit costs is referred to as the technological leader, and 
the one with higher unit costs as the follower, in the corresponding industry, and when both 
firms have the same unit costs they are referred to as neck-and-neck. In these "neck-and-neck" 
sectors, pre-innovation rents should be especially reduced by product market competition. On 
the other hand, in sectors where innovations are made by laggard firms with already very low 
initial profits, product market competition will mainly affect post innovation rents and 
therefore the Schumpeterian effect of competition should dominate. 
The essence of the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation is that the 
fraction of sectors with neck-and-neck competitors is itself endogenous, and depends upon 
equilibrium innovation intensities in the different types of sectors. More specifically, when 
competition is low a larger equilibrium fraction of sectors involve neck-and-neck competing 
incumbents, so that overall the escape competition effect is more likely to dominate the 
Schumpeterian effect. On the other hand, when competition is high, the Schumpeterian effect 
is more likely to dominate because a larger fraction of sectors in equilibrium have innovation 
being performed by laggard firms with low initial profits.  
                                                 
27 Aghion-Harris-Vickers (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt, Vickers (2001), ABBGH (2005).  
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In neck-and-neck industries competition is particularly intense and it is also in those 
industries that the “escape-competition” effect pointed out above is strongest. On the other 
hand, in less neck-and-neck, or more “unleveled”, industries, more competition may also 
reduce innovation as the laggard’s reward to catching up with the technological leader may 
fall (this is a “Schumpeterian effect” of the kind emphasized in the earlier models). Finally, by 
increasing innovation incentives relatively more in neck-and-neck industries than in unleveled 
industries, an increase in product market competition will tend to reduce the fraction of neck-
and-neck industries in the economy in equilibrium; this “composition effect” reinforces the 
Schumpeterian effect in inducing a negative correlation between product market competition 
and aggregate productivity growth or the aggregate rate of innovations. 
The inverted-U shape can be simply explained as follows. When there is not much product 
market competition there is hardly any incentive for neck-and-neck firms to innovate, and 
therefore the overall innovation rate will be highest when the sector is unleveled (when firms 
differ in their efficiency). Thus the industry will be quick to leave the unleveled state (which it 
does as soon as the laggard innovates) and slow to leave the leveled state (which will not 
happen until one of the neck-and-neck firms innovates). As a result the industry will spend 
most of the time in the leveled state, where the escape-competition effect dominates. In other 
words, if the degree of competition is very low to begin with, an increase in competition 
should result in a faster average innovation rate. 
On the other hand, when competition is initially very high, there is relatively little incentive 
for the laggard in an unleveled state to innovate. Thus the industry will be relatively slow to 
leave the unleveled state. Meanwhile the large incremental profit from innovating gives firms 
in the leveled state a relatively large incentive to innovate, so that the industry will be 
relatively quick to leave the leveled state. As a result, the industry will spend most of the time 
in the unleveled state where the Schumpeterian effect is at work on the laggard, while the 
leader never innovates. In other words, if the degree of competition is very high to begin with, 
an increase in competition should result in a slower average innovation rate. 
Hence the possibility of an inverse-U relationship between competition and innovation. When 
competition is low, an increase will raise innovation through the escape-competition effect, 
but when it becomes intense enough it may lower innovation through the Schumpeterian 
effect on laggards. The reason why one effect dominates when competition is low and the 
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other when competition is intense is the "composition effect" of competition on the steady-
state distribution of technology gaps across sectors. 
Recent work by Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2004) introduces entry into 
such a model. They show that the affect of increasing entry threat depends on the country, 
industry or firm’s distance to the frontier. In countries or industries that are close to the 
(world) technological frontier, fostering entry or competition will increase incumbents 
incentives to innovate in order to escape potential entrants or competitors. However, in 
countries and industries that lag far behind the frontier, higher entry or higher competition on 
their own tend to discourage incumbent firms from innovating. This model suggests that the 
overall impact of, for example, trade liberalisation will depend on the current state of 
technology in the country or industry.
28 However, in the long run trade liberalisation will 
increase the overall average growth rate because in equilibrium there will be more industries 
where the effect is positive.  
7.2  Empirical literature 
Most empirical work finds a positive effect of product market competition on innovation. 
More recent work has shown that the effect varies with a range of firm, industry and country 
characteristics. As with the theoretical literature, there is also a large amount of related work 
that could be relevant. We focus on the literature that directly links competition to innovation. 
7.2.1  The early literature 
A large early empirical literature, inspired by Schumpeter (1943), considered the cross-
sectional relationship between innovation and firm size or market concentration.
29 Many 
studies found that larger firms (either measured by size or market share) were also more 
innovative (or spent more on R&D). Across a large number of datasets it was seen that the 
bulk of patenting is done by larger firms. Scherer's early empirical work
30 showed that there 
was a relationship between firm patenting activity and firm size in the cross section. For 
example, Scherer (1965a) used patents data on Fortune 500 firms in 1959 and regressed this 
                                                 
28 This is based on the model in Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2002).  
29 Cohen and Levin (1989) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature. See also the review by Kamien and 
Schwartz (1982). 
30 See, inter alia, Scherer (1965a, 1965b). 
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on sales in 1955. He found a positive relationship. However, interestingly, he also found that 
when he allowed for non-linearities these suggested a diminishing impact at larger sizes.  
7.2.2  Methodological challenges 
There are many methodological difficulties faced by empirical researchers in this area, and 
the literature has failed to reach robust conclusions in large part because of these.
31  
First, it turned out to be important to control for other firm and industry characteristics that 
affect innovation. This is because these other characteristics are correlated with firm size and 
market structure. For example, if we showed that firm size was positively associated with 
innovative output, but we had not controlled for firm age, then it could be the case that firm 
size is correlated with age (e.g. firms get bigger as they get older) and that firm age is also 
correlated with innovative output, and that this led to a spurious correlation between firm size 
and innovation. Unless we control for at least the main observable and unobservable 
characteristics we can not be sure that we are really picking up the relationship between size 
and innovation. 
Secondly, there is a problem of reverse causality. While firm size or market structure is likely 
to affect innovation, it is also the case that successful innovation affects market structure. 
Firms that are successful innovators will either have lower costs, so be able to sell at a lower 
price, or will have superior quality goods, and in either case will gain market share.
32
To help deal with these first two difficulties it is important to have panel data - repeated 
observations of the same firms over time. However, panel data in itself does not solve these 
problems. What is important is that there is exogenous variation in the degree of competition, 
for example, policy changes that make entry easier or less costly. In addition, if we are willing 
to assume that many of the characteristics that are correlated with market power are constant 
over time, then fixed effects can be used to control for them.
33
In addition, if we are willing to assume that market structure is predetermined (that is that 
feedback from innovation to market structure only affects future market shares, the 
                                                 
31 Cohen and Levin (1989) provide a good discussion of these issues. 
32 This point is emphasised by Demsetz (1973). 
33 There is a substantial literature on the econometric issues involved. See Nickell (1981) for a discussion of the 
bias in within groups estimator. See Arellano and Bond (1991) for a discussion of first-differences estimation. 
See Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1999) for a discussion of the GMM Systems estimator. 
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anticipation of innovation does not affect current market structure) then repeated observations 
allow us to use lags of market structure. 
Thirdly, the relationship we are interested in is between product market competition and 
innovation, while the early literature largely focused on the relationship between firm size or 
market concentration and innovation. These may not be good measures of the degree of 
competition, and may in fact reflect other differences, for example, a firm's ability to access 
finance. It can be difficult to obtain good measures of the degree of product market 
competition in an industry, and recent work has paid careful attention to this. Boone (2000) 
shows it is not always the case that an increase in competition reduces firm size, price cost 
margins or concentration. 
There is also a number of difficulties with measuring innovation, which are discussed below. 
A combination of improved data availability (and in particular the availability of firm level 
panel data sets), better econometric methods and more computing power meant that many of 
these problems could be tackled by the mid 1990s.  
7.2.3  Evidence from UK micro data 
Two studies that used micro data from the UK to tackle these issues were Nickell (1996) and 
Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999). Both use data on firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. The UK turned out to be a good place to study the relation between product market 
competition and innovation because there have been a large number of policy changes which 
led to (relatively) exogenous variation in the nature and magnitude of product market 
structures and competition. These included the large scale privatisations of the 1980s and 
1990s, reforms associated with EU integration, and the opening up of markets in numerous 
other ways. 
Nickell (1996) considered the link between market structure and both the level and growth 
rate in total factor productivity (TFP).
34 Nickell's paper was the first to tackle many of the 
empirical issues head on. Using firm level panel data he was able to control for unobservable 
(correlated) characteristics that were constant over time. He used better measures of product 
market competition, in particular a Lerner Index. Nickell provides convincing support for the 
                                                 
34 Nickell used firm level panel data including 978 observations on 147 stock market listed firms from 1975-
1986. 
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idea that tougher competition in the product market is associated with higher growth rates in 
TFP - higher concentration and a higher level of rents are associated with lower growth rates 
of TFP. Nickell’s results also imply that the effects where economically important. Increasing 
competition, by going from the eightieth percentile in the distribution of rents to the twentieth 
(reducing rents means increasing competition),
35 has the impact of increasing TFP growth by 
around 3.8 percentage points. This is a large and economically significant effect. Moving 
from the median to the twentieth percentile would be associated with an increase in TFP 
growth of around 1.2 percentage points. Nickell’s results can also be used to show how much 
of TFP growth in UK listed firms is explained by differences in competition. They suggest 
that the differences that arise in average industry growth rates due to differences in the level 
of competition across these industries, holding everything else constant are substantial. For 
example, TFP growth in electrical engineering was 2.4 percentage points lower, on average, 
due to low levels of competition, while mechanical engineering experienced around 1 
percentage point higher TFP growth due to relatively higher levels of competition. 
Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999), henceforth BGVR, use UK firm level panel data 
on innovation counts.
36 This paper explores the two main interpretations of the observed 
correlation between market dominance and innovation: (i) that financial market failures meant 
that firms had to rely on their own internal sources of funds in order to finance innovation, 
and that larger firms had deeper pockets and were thus better able to do this, (ii) the idea 
(Gilbert and Newbery (1982)) that dominant firms have greater incentives to innovate 
(because of the greater reduction in total industry profits if entry occurs). BGVR's results 
show that less competitive industries (those with higher concentration levels and lower 
imports) had fewer aggregate innovations. But dominant firms innovated the most. Dominant 
firms get a bigger payoff on the stock market from an innovation, giving them a greater 
incentive to pre-emptively innovate. 
                                                 
35 The distribution of rents among firms in Nickell’s sample was zero at the twentieth percentile and 0.29 at the 
eightieth percentile. Looking at a very similar data set we can see that the mean and median are around 0.20. 
These are combined with Nickell’s estimated coefficient on rents of -0.13. 
36 The data are from SPRU and Datastream and include 3511 observations on 340 stock market listed firms over 
the period 1972-1982. 
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7.2.4  Recent empirical work suggests the effect varies along several dimensions 
The relationship between competition and innovation may be non-linear 
As discussed above, new endogenous growth models suggested that the relationship between 
competition and innovation may be non-linear, with both very high and very low levels of 
product market competition providing lower incentives to innovation.  
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005), henceforth  ABBGH, investigate 
whether there is a non-monotonic relationship between innovation and product market 
competition using micro panel data on UK establishments.
37 They use a Lerner index to 
measure variation in competition across industries. To deal with the potential endogeneity of 
competition ABBGH instrument product market competition with a large number of policy 
reforms, including the EU Single Market Programme, competition policy reforms and 
privatizations. They find strong evidence of an inverted U relationship between innovation, as 
measured by the citation weighted patent count, and product market competition. The peak of 
the inverted U lies near the median of the distribution. A simple linear relationship would 
yield a positive slope, as suggested by earlier work. Controlling for endogeneity and industry 
characteristics shifts the peak toward the more competitive direction but still suggests the 
importance of the Schumpeterian effect for a significant minority of firms and industries. 
The theory suggests that this effect varies with the degree of neck-and-neckness (the 
dispersion of firm level technology and costs, see discussion above in section 2.1.6). This is 
measured by the proportional distance a firm is from the technological frontier (measured by 
total factor productivity). The theory predicts that the inverted U shaped relationship between 
competition and growth should be steeper for more neck-and-neck industries,
38 and this is 
supported by the data. This paper lends empirical support to the model in which incumbent 
firms can innovate (as well as entrants) so that innovation incentives depend on the difference 
between post-innovation and pre-innovation rents. 
                                                 
37 They use data on UK listed firms over the period 1968-1997 and include information on costs, sales, 
investments and the number of successful patent applications at the US patent office. Detailed information on 
citations are used to weight the measure of patents granted for each firm in each year. 
38 The reason for this is that in industries where firms are closer to the technological frontier the escape 
competition effect tends to be stronger (the increasing part of the inverted-U is steeper) 
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Entry and trade liberalisation encourages innovation in some industries, but discourages it 
in others 
Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2004, 2005) find empirical support, using UK 
plant level data, for the idea that in countries or industries that are close to the (world) 
technological frontier, fostering entry or competition will increase incumbents’ incentives to 
innovate in order to escape potential entrants or competitors.
39 ABGHP look at the 
relationship between foreign firm entry and growth in total factor productivity, and how this 
relationship varies with an industry’s distance to the technological frontier. Endogeneity 
(relative changes in the entry rate across industries may be indirectly caused by shocks to 
patenting) is controlled for using policy
40 and foreign technology variables as excluded 
instruments that determine entry but have no direct effect on the growth in TFP or patenting.   
The impact of entry on growth in total factor productivity is positive, statistically significant 
(when entry is instrumented the coefficient gets larger, indicating a negative bias) and 
economically significant. Increasing the entry rate from the mean by one standard deviation 
(from 0.44% to 3.8%) would result in a rise in the average growth rate of TFP about 1.3 
percentage points. ABGHP interact entry with an incumbent's distance to the technology 
frontier. The results suggest that  the effect of entry on TFP growth is larger when an industry 
is closer to the technological frontier. In countries and industries that lag far behind the 
frontier, higher entry or higher competition on their own tend to discourage incumbent firms 
from innovating. Therefore, the overall impact of liberalisation will depend on the current 
state of technology in the country or industry. 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) relate a large number of reforms to growth in total factor 
productivity across OECD countries. In their paper the impact of product market reforms is 
assumed to affect the rate of TFP convergence across countries and industries, and they find 
some evidence that the impact of reforms is larger for countries further behind the frontier. 
Those countries and industries experiencing the greatest reform experience temporarily faster 
growth rates while they catch up to the international steady-state growth rate. Nicoletti and 
                                                 
39 The model is estimated using micro-level data on productivity growth and patenting activity of British firms 
between 1987 and 1993. Data is combined from three main sources - data on UK manufacturing plants from the 
Annual Census of Production, data from the US patent office and firm level accounting data from DataStream.  
40 The instruments used are: investigations and decisions by the Monopoly and Merger Commission, 
privatization cases of large publicly owned companies and indicators for 3-digit industries expected to be highly 
affected by the EU Single Market Programme. 
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Scarpetta’s work also raises important questions about how we measure and use variation in 
product market regulations in empirical work.  
Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2003) find very different results using industry level 
data for Indian states. They compare performance before and after a period of large scale 
reforms that liberalised entry, and also consider how the impact of liberalisation varied with 
extent of labour market regulations. In contrast to Nicoletti and Scarpetta, their results suggest 
that state-industries that are closer to the frontier before the reforms experienced faster growth 
following the reform than state-industries that were farther from the frontier. They also find 
that the impact of reforms was lower in states where labour market laws were more pro-
worker – these states had lower productivity before the reforms and experienced less of an 
acceleration after the reforms. 
While not our prime area of interest, there is a large cross-country literature on labour market 
regulation and performance. As suggested by Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2003), 
it may be that product and labour market reforms interact in important ways and we hope to 
be able to capture this in our analysis. For example, recent work by Caballero, Cowan, Engel 
and Micco (2004) finds that employment protection legislation hampers the creative-
destruction process, especially in countries where regulations are likely to be enforced. Work 
at the OECD (Bassanini and Ernst (2002), Nicoletti, Bassanini, Ernst, Jean, Santiago and 
Swaim (2001)),  “…provides some cross-country evidence that enhancing competition in the 
product market -- while guaranteeing intellectual property rights -- seems to have a positive 
impact on the innovation performance of a country. Conversely, the relationship between 
innovation and job protection does not seem to be univocal. The sign and magnitude of the 
effect of the latter crucially depends on the systems of industrial relations and the specific 
characteristics of each industry.”  They find that employment protection policies affect 
innovation activity, with the sign of the effect varying with other institutions and 
technological regimes. Countries with stricter employment regulations tend to specialise in 
industries with relatively lower R&D intensity and wages. 
7.2.5  Previous studies on product market reforms and macro-economic performance 
This study follows on from two previous studies for the European Commission. The first, 
Griffith and Harrison (2004), analyses the macro-economic impact of product market reforms 
undertaken in the European Union over the 1980s and 1990s. The second, Cincera and Galgau 
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(2005), examines the macroeconomic impact of entry and exit. Both studies took a similar 
two-stage approach, which is also followed in this study.  
Griffith and Harrison (2004) identified the level of competition (as measured by the markup 
or Lerner Index) as a key determinant of economic outcomes in that it determines firms’ 
incentives to adopt best practice and to innovate. This is the channel highlighted in the 
literature. As discussed above, product market reforms affect the level of economic rents in 
the economy, either directly or by encouraging the entry of new firms. This method captures 
the impact of product market reforms on competition and the impact of competition on 
allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency, and includes the impact of competition on both 
innovation and imitation, as measured by R&D expenditure and total factor productivity. It 
does not capture returns to scale. 
This study showed that product market reforms that ease entry, reduce tariff rates and 
regulatory barriers to trade, remove price controls, and reduce public involvement in 
production affect the average level of economic rents in the economy in diverse ways. 
Reforms to labour and credit markets are associated with reductions in the level of economic 
rents available. The level of economic rents is negatively associated with employment and 
investment, or in other words greater competition is associated with higher levels of 
employment and investment, particularly in the service sector. These results accord with 
theoretical predictions. Increases in competition bring prices closer to marginal costs, 
increasing output demanded and thus leading to increases in factor demands. 
Cincera and Galgau (2005) found that PMRs lead to increased entry and exit. In particular, 
decreasing price controls and hidden import barriers and increasing the ease of starting a new 
business had positive effect on both entry and exit. A decrease in transfers and subsidies from 
government to the private sector lead to a decline in entry and exit as did lower tariff rates. 
There was some indication that entry and exit were associated with higher productivity levels 
and growth rates and higher R&D investment. 
Griffith and Harrison (2004) found that regulatory reforms that reduced the level of economic 
rents appear to be associated with lower levels of labour and total factor productivity. In 
addition, while there appears to be a non-linear relationship between the level of economic 
rents and levels of R&D expenditure and growth rates of labour and total factor productivity, 
most countries appear to have levels of economic rents where a reduction in rents is 
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associated with a reduction in R&D and growth rates. This is identified by looking at changes 
over time within countries. When the average differences across countries are considered we 
see the opposite – countries with lower average levels of rents are those that have higher 
productivity, TFP and R&D investment. Interpreting these latter results is, however, 
problematic as it was not possible to separately identify the impact of the average level of 
rents across countries from the impact of measurement issues and other country 
characteristics that are not observed. There are a number of further reasons why caution 
should be used in interpretation – some to do with possible measurement issues, others to do 
with timing and dynamics.  
The first issue is related to the most robust effect of product market reforms that was 
identified in the study – increasing employment. To the extent that increases in employment 
as a result of product market reforms bring less skilled workers into the workforce, this will 
act to reduce the average level of productivity. One indication of this effect is that a large 
proportion of the gains in employment were in relatively low productivity service sectors. 
This composition effect should act as a one-off reduction in productivity, unless sectors with 
high employment growth also have low potential for productivity improvements. 
Secondly it is also likely that dynamic processes are important here, and with the limited time 
series of data available it was not possible to fully investigate these. For example, the 
literature emphasises the fact that adjustment costs in R&D are high (higher than for general 
employment or physical capital)
41 and it may take firms and others a long time to adjust to 
change. 
7.3  Implications for our study 
What does the literature suggest about the way we should proceed to understand the 
relationship between competition, innovation and TFP performance at the macro level across 
EU countries? 
                                                 
41 See, inter alia, Hall (1993). 
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7.3.1  Product market reforms, entry and rents 
First, the literature emphasises the importance of economic profits, or rents, in providing 
incentives for firms to enter markets and to innovate. Competition reduces the level of these 
profits and so discourages innovation and entry (for a given level of entry costs). At the same 
time, lower rents may encourage firms to innovate to escape the consequences of competition. 
For this reason, one of our main interests is in investigating empirically how product market 
reforms have affected the level of rents, and in turn how the level of rents have affected entry 
and innovation. 
However, the macroeconomic relationship between product market reforms, entry and rents is 
likely to be complex. In most macroeconomic models of product market regulation (for 
example Blanchard and Giavazzi, (2003)) product market reforms can affect competition 
either directly, through the intensity with which firms interact in the product market, or 
indirectly through the costs of entry. In equilibrium the level of rents reflects both these 
factors, so that high rents will encourage entry, which will in turn reduce rents up until the 
point at which they just cover entry costs. Reducing barriers to entry will thus be reflected in 
equilibrium in lower levels of rents. This is the reason why one of our main interests will be 
the way that product market reforms affect rents. In the short run, however, rents may take 
time to respond to increased entry. While we would have liked to also look at entry rates, as 
they could provide a more timely indication of some types of competition, we found that the 
data was not suitable to do so (see Appendix II.2.3).  
Secondly, the methodological difficulties discussed in section 7.2.2 suggest that it is 
important that we use panel data, and have exogenous variation over time in product market 
reforms, to allow us to identify the impact of product market reforms on competition. This is a 
particular challenge for this work, as there have not been a large number of differential 
reforms across EU countries, and for those that there have been we often do not have very 
good measures. Because of this we pay careful attention in Section 9 to which reforms we can 
use, and how in fact they might affect rents and entry rates. 
7.3.2  Competition, innovation and imitation 
The relationship between rents, innovation activity and productivity growth will introduce 
further uncertainty and lags into the relationship between product market reforms and 
innovation performance. The literature has emphasised that fact that investment in innovative 
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activity is a long-term and high risk decision, and thus is potentially subject to high 
adjustment costs and uncertain returns. This means it may take time for product market 
reforms to be reflected in firms’ innovation decisions and in productivity outcomes. The entry 
of new firms in response to lower entry costs, and the exit of inefficient firms in response to 
more intense competition may also occur only after a significant amount of time. We will 
attempt to take account of these factors in our methodology, but data limitations may limit our 
ability to estimate lagged relationships. In particular we have data on entry and exit only for a 
relatively short time period. 
The literature also suggests that competition and the threat of entry have important 
implications for firms’ incentives to adopt the latest technologies. While frontier innovation 
may drive TFP growth in leading edge firms and industries, imitation and the spread of new 
technologies will also feed through into macroeconomic performance. However, imitation 
itself may provide a disincentive for frontier innovation, so there may be a trade off in this 
dimension. Although it is generally easier to measure innovation than imitation, in 4 we 
examine various empirical measures of innovation and imitation that we could use in our 
empirical analysis. 
7.3.3  Interactions with firm, industry and country characteristics 
Finally, much of the recent literature emphasizes that the impact of product market 
competition on innovation and imitation may depend on other characteristics of the firm, 
industry or country. The main characteristics highlighted by the literature are distance to the 
technological frontier, and labour and financial market institutions. The first of these is clearly 
linked to the distinction between frontier innovation and imitation, while labour and financial 
market institutions may also have direct effects on innovative activity. In the main results we 
discuss these factors. 
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8  Innovation and imitation  
In this section we start by discussing issues in the measurement of innovation and imitation. 
Our focus is to determine which measures we will use in our empirical analysis. We then 
provide an overview of innovation and imitation activity across EU countries. This provides 
us with a useful indication of where variation occurs and thus where our attention should 
focus in modeling the relationships between product market reforms, innovation, imitation 
and total factor productivity. 
This discussion highlights the following key points: 
•  The main measures of innovation we will use are Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) 
and patents (including data on all patents taken out at the European Patents Office and 
triadic patents). We use both because R&D expenditures will capture resources 
devoted to all private sector innovative activity, not just that that is ultimately 
successful in producing new products and processes, whereas patents only capture 
successful innovation. Both will capture process and product innovation and both 
drastic and incremental innovation. 
•  Imitation is harder to measure. As our primary measure we will proxy a country’s 
scope for benefiting from technological diffusion by the distance that it lies behind the 
technological frontier (the country with the highest productivity). As a robustness 
check on our main measure we check that the distance to the technological frontier 
measure is correlated with other measures such as payments for purchases of 
technology from abroad which we might expect to be directly related to the extent of 
imitation. 
•  Our focus will be on activities conducted by firms (not by governments), since these 
are the activities most directly affected by product market reforms. However, there are 
large and important differences across countries and industries in the extent to which 
governments finance innovative activities undertaken by the private sector, and it will 
be important to account for this in our empirical analysis; 
•  Innovative activity has become more internationalised over time; we see an increase in 
the share of R&D within countries that is conducted by foreign affiliates, and an 
  78 
increase in the level of imported technologies. These vary substantially across 
countries. 
•  Trends in labour productivity highlight three groups of countries: (i) those with high 
levels of labour productivity, including Belgium, France and Italy, (ii) those with 
initial low levels of labour productivity which grow more rapidly than the average 
over the 1980s and 1990s (i.e. converge to the frontier), including some Scandinavian 
countries and the UK, and (iii) those with initially middle range levels which do not 
show strong growth, including Canada, the Netherlands and Spain. 
•  Trends in R&D intensity show that: (i) Sweden and Finland have increased R&D 
intensity both by shifting towards more R&D intensive industries, and also by 
increasing R&D intensity within industry, (ii) all other countries (except Belgium) 
have shifted towards less R&D intensive industries, largely reflecting the growing 
importance of service industries 
•  Variation across countries and industries suggests that it will be important for us to 
model heterogeneity in the impact of product market reforms. Ascertaining which 
factors are the most important determinants of this variation in performance will be an 
important and difficult challenge in our empirical work. 
8.1  Measuring innovation and imitation 
For the purpose of the current study we require robust measures of innovative activity that are 
comparable both across countries and industries. Here we discuss a range of measures that 
have been used in the literature, focusing on those which we will exploit in this study, 
distinguishing between measures of inputs into innovative activity, outputs of innovative 
activity and indicators of imitation and technological diffusion. 
8.1.1  Innovation 
Indicators of innovative activity cover both inputs into the innovation process and outputs. 
Commonly used measures of inputs are research and development expenditure or employment 
in innovative activities, while patent counts and TFP growth are often used as measures of 
innovative outputs. 
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Innovation inputs 
When making international comparisons of innovative activity two commonly cited measures 
are Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP, (which includes both public 
and private sector R&D expenditure, and which is used for the EU 3% target), and Business 
Enterprise R&D (BERD) as a percentage of GDP which includes only R&D conducted by the 
private sector. As shown in Section 8.2, the latter measure of R&D intensity varies 
substantially across European countries. It is also possible to break Business Enterprise R&D 
down by source of funding and differentiate between private and public sector funding. The 
extent to which private sector R&D is funded by the private versus the public sector varies by 
industry and country.  
An alternative indicator of market sector innovation inputs is how intensively research staff 
are employed in the private sector within each country. As the majority of R&D expenditure 
is devoted to wages this alternative indicator is highly correlated with GERD and BERD 
intensity. However, if PPP deflators used in international comparisons of R&D expenditure 
do not accurately reflect the relative price of R&D across countries then such headcount 
measures may be a useful alternative. On the other hand, a headcount does not reflect 
potential differences in the quality of workers across industries or countries. 
It is important to consider a measure of innovation inputs as well as a measure of innovation 
outputs, as product market reforms and changes in the degree of product market competition 
affect firms’ incentives to carry out innovative activity, not all of which will ultimately result 
in an innovation. Our main measure will be Business Enterprise R&D measured at the 
country and industry level. We will also investigate incorporating measures of government 
financed (private and public sector) R&D expenditure at the country level to control for 
differences in the extent of public sector R&D across countries. While we would not expect 
this to be directly affected by product market reforms, there may be interactions between 
public and private sector R&D activity in determining an economy’s innovative performance 
which it may be important to account for in our empirical work.  
 
 




Two commonly used measures of innovation outputs are counts of patents and counts of 
patents weighted by citations, which aims to reflect the variation in their quality or value – the 
more a patent is cited the greater its scientific importance.  
Patents are a very heterogeneous measure of innovation.
42 One patent can represent a path 
breaking new technology, worth billions of Euros, while another can represent a fairly 
incremental improvement in an existing technology, worth only tens of thousands of dollars. 
In order to get around this problem many researchers use citation-weighted patents,
43 or use 
stock market data to put a value to a patent.
44 Another problem with patents is that the 
propensity to patent, and the degree to which they provide protection of intellectual property 
rights, varies substantially from industry to industry. For example, patents are widely used in 
the pharmaceuticals industry, but rarely used in the computer software industry. 
In addition, the extent to which patents are used by firms in practice will vary both across 
industries and countries. In Section 8.2 we discuss how a country’s industrial structure affects 
overall R&D intensity in more detail. The extent to which firms within different countries use 
specific patent offices (e.g. the European and US Patent Offices) will also vary. A commonly 
used measure that avoids this latter bias is “triadic patent families”, that is inventions that are 
registered at the three main patent offices (US, Europe and Japan). This measure also focuses 
on high value patents, since it is only those patents that are worth a considerable amount that a 
firm will patent in all three locations. Innovation outputs are then expressed as the number of 
triadic patent families per capita. As Section 8.2 illustrates, there is substantial variation in 
this measure across European countries. This measure of innovation outputs is also highly 
correlated with the measure of innovation inputs (BERD as a % of GDP), described above. 
 
                                                 
42 See Griliches (1990) for a comprehensive treatment of this issue. 
43 This method assumes that valuable patents are cited more frequently by other patents than lower value patents. 
Each patent is weighted by the number of citations it receives, thus helping to measure the importance or quality 
of the patent. See, for example, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson(1993). 
44 See, for example, Pakes (1986). 
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TFP growth 
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth, is a measure of technological progress (and thus 
reflects both implemented frontier innovation and imitation), but it can be difficult to 
accurately measure, because of the well known problem that commonly used measures of 
TFP are themselves biased in the presence of imperfectly competitive product markets.
45 
Aggregate TFP growth is affected both by frontier innovation and by imitation and the 
diffusion of new technologies. 
New entry 
New entry may also serve as an informative indicator of innovation. In particular new entrants 
may be more likely to pursue drastic innovation strategies compared to incumbent firms, as 
by innovating they do not cannibalise rents from existing products. By comparison incumbent 
firms may be more likely to pursue incremental innovations. This comparison between 
entrants and incumbents is most appropriate for “greenfield” entrants, compared to entry by 
acquisition. Greenfield entrants might be most likely to introduce new, leading-edge 
technologies. A number of microdata studies emphasise the importance of greenfield entrants 
in contributing to productivity growth over the longer term.
 46
Relationship between inputs and outputs 
We would expect there to be a strong relationship between innovation inputs and outputs. 
Using data across countries for 2001, Figure 1 shows that there is a strong correlation between 
the two main measures of innovation inputs and innovation outputs – BERD as a % of GDP 
and triadic patent families per 1000 population. This strong correlation can also be seen in 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 in Section 8.2.1 which rank countries on the individual measures.  
Figure 1 also highlights a couple of important measurement issues. First, Switzerland is an 
outlier in that its number of triadic patent families is higher than its BERD as a % of GDP 
would suggest. Reasons for this may include both the fact that Switzerland has high GDP per 
                                                 
45 See, inter alia, Hall (1988), Klette and Griliches (1996) and Klette (1999). 
46 See Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000) and Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003). See also Henderson (1993) 
with regard to drastic innovation by entrants. 
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capita, but also the fact that a large proportion of its R&D is concentrated in pharmaceuticals, 
an industry where patents are crucial for protecting the returns from innovation. Secondly, 
there are a number of countries clustered along the x-axis with very low counts of triadic 
patent families. Most of these are new EU members, which may indicate that a large 
proportion of their R&D expenditure represents imitation activity rather than frontier 
innovation, and thus generates few patents. We discuss the distinction between innovation and 
imitation further in the next section. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD MSTI.  
Note: data for BERD as a % GDP for Luxembourg and Switzerland are for 2000. 
8.1.2  Imitation 
Measuring technological diffusion or imitation is far from straightforward. At best we can 
produce proxies for this activity. As discussed above, TFP growth will reflect imitation as 
well as innovation. The most direct measure is probably citations in patents. We also consider 
a very broad measure of the scope for technology transfer, distance from the technological 
frontier, and more direct measures of cross border technological diffusion in the form of R&D 
activity carried out by affiliates of foreign owned multinationals in the host country and 
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Patent citations can provide direct information on knowledge flows between firms. However, 
it is important to note that citations are only observed when a firm applies for a patent. That 
is, patent citations are only observed for those firms that are successful innovators, and not 
necessarily for those firms that imitate technologies but do not build upon them. They may, 
therefore, understate the true extent of imitative activity.  
Convergence in productivity 
The distance that a country, industry or firm lies from the technological frontier can be used 
as a measure of the potential for imitation or technological diffusion. For example, the 
technological frontier might be defined as the country with the highest level of productivity 
within a given industry. For each non-frontier country the potential for imitation is then 
measured as the gap between their own level of productivity and productivity at the frontier. 
The further a country lies behind the frontier the greater the scope for technological diffusion. 
This approach is taken in the recent literature. Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2004) find 
that within industries, total factor productivity (TFP) growth is higher the further a country 
lies behind the frontier. They also find that R&D has a specific role in increasing the rate of 
TFP growth (technology transfer) by raising absorptive capacity.  Nicoletti and Scarpetta 
(2003) use this approach and find that product market reforms directly affect the speed of 
productivity convergence. 
Figure 2 below shows value added per worker (a measure of labour productivity) in 2000 in 
manufacturing for some EU countries and the USA. Following the discussion above, we 
could consider the USA as the frontier country according to this measure, so that the potential 
for technology transfer through imitation is least for countries like Belgium, larger for 
countries like the UK, and largest for the Czech Republic and Poland, whose labour 
productivity in manufacturing is only about one third of that of the USA. The picture is 
similar when we look at the service sector or individual manufacturing industries, although 
the identity of the frontier country, and countries’ relative distance to the frontier, vary 
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somewhat across industries. In Section 8.2.1 we examine the convergence of productivity 
levels over time. 
 










































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD STAN database and PPP exchange rates. 
 
We will use measures of the distance to the technological frontier as proxies for the scope for 
technological diffusion. This has the merit that it is easily measurable in the available data for 
a wide range of countries and time periods. It can also be directly related to theoretical models 
that predict different effects of competition on innovative activity depending on whether a 
country lies on or behind the frontier. In our empirical work we will therefore investigate 
whether product market reforms have different impacts on innovative activity and on macro-
performance depending on the extent to which countries lie behind the frontier. If they do, this 
implies that policy reforms of this type may have differential effects depending on a country’s 
relative technological position.  
As a robustness check, in section II.2.1 we relate this measure to information on more direct 
measures of the potential mechanisms through which this cross border technology transfer 
might operate, two of which we consider below. Other factors, which we do not consider in 
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our analysis, might be common language and the migration of highly skilled or R&D 
employees. 
 
Foreign direct investment, R&D expenditure by foreign-owned affiliates 
One measure is the percentage of host country R&D expenditures by enterprises that is 
carried out by foreign affiliates in the host country. This is shown in Figure 3 below, and 
suggests that a number of the more peripheral EU countries Ireland, Italy and Spain exhibit a 
high proportion of R&D expenditures being carried out by foreign affiliates located in those 
countries. 
This may well be positively correlated with more general measures of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Indeed, much broader measures of foreign direct investment could also be 
used as measures of the potential for imitation, such as employment in foreign-owned 
affiliates in production and service activities. Such measures of the presence of foreign-owned 
firms are often used when examining whether domestic-owned firms benefit from 
technological spillovers from FDI.  While much attention has been paid to trying to estimate 
the extent to which domestic firms benefit from spillovers from FDI, it is also possible that 
outward FDI in R&D is actually carried out in order to benefit from technological expertise 
and know-how abroad. That is, technology sourcing may be a motivation for carrying out 
R&D abroad – spillovers may flow to, rather than from the foreign investor. Recent literature 
has shown this to be an important motivation for R&D locations of multinational firms.
47
                                                 
47 See, inter alia, Griffith, Harrison and Van Reneen (2004) and Branstetter (2004). 
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Figure 3: R&D expenditure by foreign affiliates as a % of R&D expenditure of 
enterprises in the host country, 2001 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, OECD MSTI. 
 
Imported technology 
A second potential indicator of cross-border technology transfer is technology payments, (that 
is payments for the acquisition or use of licenses, patents, trademarks etc, and for R&D 
carried out abroad), measured as a proportion of GERD or of GDP. This gives an idea of how 
intensively a country imports technology from abroad relative to total domestic R&D activity. 
This is shown below in Figure 4 for the year 1999 for the countries where it is available. 
There has been an increase since the early 1980s in this measure of imported technology, with 
significant variation across countries. For example, in 1981 the UK, France Germany all had 
technology payments of around 6 to 9% of GERD. In 2001 the UK figure was over 30%, and 
Germany over 40%, whereas the figure for France remained at around 10% of GERD. 
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Figure 4: Technology payments as a percentage of GERD, 1999 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD MSTI.  
 
For the countries where data is available there is some evidence of a negative correlation 
between this measure and GERD intensity, (for example, for the year shown in Figure 4 the 
correlation is –0.55). Hungary, Portugal and the Czech Republic are among the most intensive 
technology importing countries but had relatively low GERD intensity. 
8.2  Mapping innovative activity 
We begin by providing some aggregate cross-country descriptive statistics based on the main 
innovation measures outlined in section II.1. We also look at evidence on productivity 
convergence over time across countries. This description is important in informing us about 
the sort of variation we see in the data, and therefore which effects we will be able to identify 
in modeling the relationship between product market reforms, innovation, imitation and 
productivity growth. We then look at the role of industrial structure in accounting for 
differences in R&D intensity. Finally we describe entry and exit activity of both firms in 
general and patenting firms. 
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8.2.1  Aggregate cross-country comparisons 
In this section we focus on private sector R&D activity. Figure 5 shows that Business 
Enterprise R&D (BERD) as a proportion of GDP, varies dramatically across European 
countries. In 2001 BERD comprises over 3% of GDP in Sweden and Finland, but under 1% in 
more peripheral regions of the EU 15 (Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), as well as 
in a number of 2004 accession countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia). This measure is highly correlated with a measure of the intensity with which 
research staff are employed in the private sector. Finland and Sweden have over 10 
researchers per 1000 industry employees, whereas Portugal and Poland have less than one. 
Within countries there has also been substantial variation in the path of BERD as a % of GDP 
over time. For example between 1981 and 2001 BERD intensity in Sweden and in Finland 
increased by over 1.5 percentage points of GDP, whereas in the UK it actually decreased by 
0.25 percentage points. Most OECD countries experienced a modest increase of between 0 
and 0.5 percentage points of GDP. In the next section we discuss the extent to which 
differences in industrial structure can explain differences in aggregate BERD intensity across 
countries. This covers all R&D conducted by business. As highlighted above, the amount of 
this R&D expenditure that is financed by government varies over industries and countries. 
This is important in considering the impact of product market reforms, as these will affect 
privately financed R&D more than government financed R&D. There is also variation in the 
extent to which R&D is funded by foreign firms. For example, in 2001 the UK has the highest 
proportion of BERD funded from abroad, at around 25%, compared to 9% in France and 2% 
in Germany. 
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Figure 5: BERD as a % of GDP, 2001 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD MSTI.  
Note: data for Luxembourg and Switzerland are for 2000. 
 
Figure 6 shows the number of triadic patent families (patents registered in Europe, US and 
Japan) per 1000 population for the year 2001. This is a measure of innovation that gives some 
account of the quality and importance of the innovation. Again, Sweden and Finland have the 
highest numbers of registered patents with Poland, Portugal and Greece at the bottom of the 
distribution. 
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Figure 6: Number of triadic patent families per 1000 population, 2001 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD MSTI.  
 
Productivity convergence  
An important focus of our attention will be the impact of product market reforms on labour 
productivity and total factor productivity growth (largely through their impact on innovation, 
imitation and entry). We therefore consider recent trends in productivity, and whether EU 
countries show signs of convergence. The patterns we see vary across countries. Figure 7 
illustrates this for a measure of labour productivity, value-added per worker. Labour 
productivity in each country is indexed relative to the technological frontier, which in each 
year is the USA. The frontier is indexed at 1.00, so the figure expresses labour productivity in 
each country in each year as a percentage of labour productivity in the USA.  
Three distinct groups of countries can be distinguished. Three countries have quite high levels 
of labour productivity relative to the US throughout the period. These are France, Belgium 
and Italy. They exhibit convergence over the 1980s but not over the 1990s. Three countries – 
Canada, the Netherlands and Spain – show divergence or no convergence during the 1980s 
and then divergence over the 1990s. Finally the third group, comprising some Scandinavian 
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economies and the UK, starts off with much lower labour productivity relative to the USA 
and shows convergence until around 1995, at which labour productivity relative to the USA 
remains fairly constant. A similar variation in convergence emerges using Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP), although some of the relative levels look quite different. For example, 
Italy’s relative TFP is significantly lower than its relative labour productivity, reflecting high 
capital intensity in the data for Italy. 
Figure 7: Value added per worker relative to the frontier, whole economy 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD STAN database and PPP exchange rates 
 
The figure above conceals quite different patterns across sectors. In general we observe more 
productivity convergence in services than in manufacturing, which is similar to the results of 
Bernard and Jones (1996). There are some individual exceptions in manufacturing, such as 
Sweden, Finland over the 1990s, and Belgium and the UK over the 1980s and early 1990s. 
One potential explanation for the difference in the extent of convergence across the 
manufacturing and service sectors is that specialization in (traded) manufacturing acts against 
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convergence, while the composition of (largely non-traded) service sectors is much more 
similar across countries. Recent work by the OECD suggests there may even be divergence in 
high-tech manufacturing sectors (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). In the next section we 
examine the role of differences in industrial structure within countries in accounting for 
differences in R&D intensity. 
Distance to the technological frontier 
In empirical work we also use measures of distance to the technological frontier as a proxy for 
the scope for technological diffusion. Although the available data does not allow us to use 
more direct indicators of technological diffusion over time, we can check that our measure of 
distance to the technological frontier is highly correlated with these other indicators. Figure 8 
shows that there is a strong positive correlation between a country’s distance to the 
technological frontier (measured by ln(frontier TFP) - ln(country’s own TFP)), and a measure 
of the extent to which a country is making payments for imported technologies as a 
proportion of it’s total R&D expenditures (‘Technology payments as a % of GERD’). The 
only outlier is Belgium, which appears to make more technology payments than would be 
expected given its relatively small distance to the frontier. The correlation between the two 
measures across countries is 0.64, rising to 0.87 if we exclude Belgium.
48 This suggests that 
the distance to the technological frontier is a good proxy for the ratio of technology payments 
to R&D expenditure. In other words, distance to frontier is a good proxy for the potential for 
technological diffusion as opposed to innovation. 
                                                 
48 The correlation is slightly lower but still strongly positive if we use distance to the frontier based on labour 
productivity. The equivalent numbers are 0.45 and 0.77 respectively. 
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We also looked at the correlation between the measure of distance to the technological 
frontier and ‘R&D expenditure by foreign affiliates as a percentage of BERD’. Here the 
correlation is less strong which is consistent with the possibility that foreign multinationals 
may be conducting R&D in some countries in order to source technology and access skilled 
labour, rather than acting solely as a conduit for spillovers to domestic firms.  
8.2.2  The role of industrial structure 
Countries can have high overall BERD intensity because they have high BERD intensity 
within particular industries, or because their industrial structure is concentrated in industries 
that have high average BERD intensity, or both.
49 To investigate this between 1987 and 2000 
we decompose the difference between each country’s overall BERD intensity and an average 
for the 7 EU countries for which data is available into two components.
50 The first component 
                                                 
49 In analysing this it should be noted that the results should be seen simply as a snapshot of a point in time, 
rather than as causal explanations of overall R&D intensity. This is because R&D intensity affects an industry’s 
share in value added by raising its productivity. 
50 The comparison group is an un-weighted average of Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. The choice of comparison is driven by data availability, but the exact choice does not affect the 
conclusions. 
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is the part of the difference that is due to a different composition of output between high-tech 
manufacturing industries, low-tech manufacturing industries, and non-manufacturing sectors. 
The second component is the part of the difference that is due to higher or lower BERD 
intensity within these three broad sectors. 
Figure 9 shows the first “industrial structure” component in 1987 and 2000 for the countries 
for which data is available. Bars to the right hand side of the vertical line show that industrial 
structure made a positive contribution to R&D intensity in a particular country relative to the 
average. Looking at the figures for 2000, we can see that, for example, Sweden and Finland’s 
industrial structure results in an overall BERD intensity that is around 0.5% of GDP higher 
than the average, and 0.8% of GDP higher than Denmark or the Netherlands. For Sweden and 
Finland this has increased substantially between 1987 and 2000, given an overall increase in 
average R&D intensity of 0.4% GDP. In all other countries, except Belgium, it has moved in 
the opposite direction, reflecting the shift in most economies towards service sectors. 
Figure 9: Contribution of industrial structure to BERD intensity, 1987 and 2000 













Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD STAN and ANBERD databases. 
Notes: 2000 figure for Denmark relates to 1999. 
 
Figure 10 looks at the second component, the extent to which differences in R&D intensity 
from the EU average are due to differences in R&D intensity within sectors. Here again we 
see that Sweden and Finland top the chart. R&D intensity within sectors has increased 
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substantially. In all countries except the Scandinavian countries and Belgium we see a decline 
in R&D intensity within industries relative to the average. 
Taken together Figures 9 and 10 show that in most countries the within-sector variation 
accounts for more than the between variation. For example, in both years, for Spain it is 
within sector R&D intensity that accounts for the vast majority of the lower measured R&D 
intensity relative to the EU average. Whereas for Finland and Sweden by 2000 both industrial 
structure and above average R&D intensity within sectors make significant contributions to 
the overall higher R&D intensity in these countries. 
Figure 10: Contribution of within-sector intensity to BERD intensity, 1987 and 2000 













Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD STAN and ANBERD databases. 
Notes: 2000 figure for Denmark relates to 1999. 
 
Increased economic integration might be expected to result in increased specialisation – that is 
as trade or transport costs decrease countries might specialise in the production of particular 
products. It is possible that this also leads to specialisation in research and development 
activity in particular industries. Therefore we also looked at the extent to which R&D 
expenditure has become concentrated in particular locations over time.  
In general we find that countries’ shares of total R&D expenditure do not vary much over 
time. Although R&D in some industries did become more geographically concentrated, the 
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reverse pattern occurred in other sectors. For example between 1995 and 2000,
51 business 
enterprise R&D in the motor vehicles sector (3400) becomes significantly more 
geographically concentrated. While R&D in machinery and equipment (2933) and services 
(5099) become less concentrated.  
These results highlight the point made in 7 that there is likely to be heterogeneity in the 
effects of product market reforms on innovation activity across countries, regions and 
industries. In particular, greater flexibility in product markets may lead some innovative 
industries to concentrate in particular countries or regions within the EU, so that the amount 
of innovative activity in some countries may fall even though the total amount of innovative 
activity in the EU has increased. This precise effect may be difficult to capture in the 
empirical analysis, since the indicators of product market reform that we have collected 
mostly vary at the national level. 
8.2.3  Entry and exit 
New entry may serve as an informative indicator of innovation, particularly in service sectors 
where R&D and patents are not very informative. In particular new entrants may be more 
likely to pursue drastic innovation strategies compared to incumbent firms, as by innovating 
they do not cannibalise rents from existing products. By comparison incumbent firms may be 
more likely to pursue incremental innovations. This comparison between entrants and 
incumbents is most appropriate for “greenfield” entrants, compared to entry by acquisition. 
Greenfield entrants might be most likely to introduce new, leading-edge technologies. A 
number of microdata studies emphasise the importance of greenfield entrants in contributing 
to productivity growth over the longer term.
 52
We have examined detailed data on individual patents taken out at the European Patent Office 
(EPO) and on triadic patent families (an indicator of high quality or drastic innovations). We 
use these data to look at how product market reforms affect innovation (patenting) by entrant 
and incumbent firms. 
                                                 
51 We have data for 11 EU countries over this period. 
52 See Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000) and Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003). See also Henderson (1993) 
with regard to drastic innovation by entrants. 
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Cincera and Galgau (2005) provides a detailed summary of entry and exit patterns across EU 
countries. We have examined the data collected from Dun and Bradstreet for the Cincera 
report. The main characteristics of the data, brought out in Cincera and Galgau (2005), are 
that for the EU as a whole entry declines over the period (1997-2003) while exit increases 
slightly. The net entry rate is declining throughout the period, it becomes negative by 2003 
(Cincera and Galgau Figure 2). There is substantial variation in entry, exit and net entry rates 
across countries and industries (Cincera and Galgau Figures 3 and 4).  
Two serious limitations of the data on entry and exit are: 
•  the short time series available (1997-2003), which makes it difficult to convincingly 
identify the effects of product market reforms from other cyclical and unobserved 
factors that affect entry and exit rates across countries, 
•  the fact that the data do not contain information on the size of entrants or their 
performance subsequent to entry (see, for example, Geroski (1995) and Aghion, 
Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2005) who emphasise this point). 
In addition, we have several concerns about measurement error in these data. For example, the 
number of firms in France is surprisingly large compared to the other countries, especially in 
a few industries, including Real Estate industry, Retail and Construction. While these 
problems are most obvious for France, they also raise doubts about the quality of the data for 
the other countries. Potential reasons for these results include different definitions of what 
constitutes a firm across countries, and inconsistencies in the way firms are assigned to 
industries. 
Before we realized the problems with this data, we planned to look at the relationship between 
product market reforms and entry and exit. The Table below shows the estimates from an 
equation of the form 
γ β α ijt it ijt X PMR E ' + + =  
where E is entry, exit or the number of incumbents. PMR stands for product market 
regulations. We use the Fraser Institute index of the ease of starting a new business (see 
Appendix III for a discussion). This is likely to be the most relevant type of regulation, as 
most entrants are very small firms.  
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In columns (1) and (4) we simply regress the number of entrants and exits, respectively, on 
the ease of starting a new business (controlling for the total number of firms), and find a 
positive and significant effect in both cases. However, in columns (2) and (5) we add country 
dummies and in columns (3) and (6) we add industry dummies, and these effects disappear. 
This suggests that the result in columns (1) and (4) is driven by variation between countries, 
while within countries over the short time period there is no evidence of a relationship 
between entry or exit and the index. We have not explored these results further due to our 
concerns about the quality of the data. 
Table II.1: Entry and Exit results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Ease of starting a new 
business  135.873 -193.010 -192.802 152.523 128.897 123.567 
 (40.287)  (154.258)  (155.670)  (55.576)  (94.538)  (94.186) 
        
Number  of  active  firms  0.056 0.056 0.056 0.013 0.013 0.008 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Constant -602.244  1,426.240  2,294.759  -656.376  -899.741  73.523 
  (295.105) (842.964)  (1,307.211)  (353.103) (538.765) (728.363) 
        
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country  dummies  no yes yes no yes yes 
Industry  dummies  no no yes no no yes 
Observations  1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 
R-squared  0.92 0.92 0.94 0.48 0.50 0.62 
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9  Product market regulations and reforms 
What have happened to product market regulations over the past two decades, and what 
reforms have been undertaken? In this section we document the main changes that have 
occurred across EU countries. In doing this we are mainly interested in two things - to 
describe patterns of reform and the type of changes we have seen, and to consider what 
variation can be used for econometric work. 
For the purposes of our analysis it is extremely important to have measures of product market 
regulation that vary over time, both in terms of data coverage, and the actual variation of 
regulation. The reason is that purely cross-sectional measures of regulation (those that do not 
change over time) do not allow us to identify separately the impact of regulation from other 
unobservable factors that affect competition and innovation outcomes across countries. 
Collecting time-varying measures of regulation allows us to use panel data techniques that 
control for any unobservable factors that do not change over time. 
The problems associated with using non-time-varying indicators are clearly illustrated in 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). This paper was discussed at some length in the previous study, 
Griffith and Harrison (2004), but it is useful to re-emphasize a few key points. Firstly the 
main countrywide measure of regulation used by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (N&S) refers to the 
situation in a single year (1998) towards the end of their sample period. This is problematic 
for two reasons: first it is purely cross-sectional information, and second it implies an 
underlying assumption that end-of-period values are representative of cross-country patterns 
of regulation over the entire 1984-1998 period. This will not be true if some countries have 
liberalized their markets faster than others. These problems make causal interpretations of the 
results extremely problematic. 
N&S do use some time-varying indicators of regulation, but these refer to specific aspects of 
regulation in seven network industries, which are unlikely to be representative of regulatory 
trends in the economy as a whole. In this current study we will not examine network 
industries separately as we consider the nature of regulation in those industries to be 
qualitatively different from regulation in the rest of the economy, both in terms of its goals 
and its effects. A reliable evaluation of the impact of regulation in those industries would 
require a detailed microeconomic investigation of each industry, which is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
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Another aspect of the measures of regulation used by N&S is worth mentioning: the 
information on product market regulations is aggregated into a single summary measure. This 
imposes strong and possibly arbitrary restrictions on the way in which individual regulations 
can affect productivity growth. It also means that it is not possible to deduce from the results 
which specific regulations have the largest effects, and how economically important those 
effects are. Capturing these differential effects in practice will be difficult due to high levels 
of correlation between different regulations (‘multicollinearity’ in technical terms) - many 
countries undertook several reforms at the same time - but a more flexible approach that uses 
greater numbers of individual indicators could be both more robust and more informative. 
Wherever possible this is the approach we take in this study. 
9.1  Overall Product Market Regulations 
The Fraser Institute Index of Economic Freedom is a collection of country-level indicators of 
the extent of regulation and government intervention in various areas, including product, 
labour and credit market regulation. The data are available at five year intervals starting in 
1975, though many of the indicators relating to product markets begin only in the 1990s. The 
indices are constructed using information from various sources, including the IMF, World 
Bank, WTO and OECD, as well as publications such as the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report.  
The key advantage of the Fraser Institute index is that it provides a long time series. As an 
example Figure 11 shows changes in the overall summary index of Economic Freedom 
between 1985 and 2000 for a group of EU countries plus the USA (note that higher values 
denote more “economic freedom”, i.e. less regulation). The figure shows that there has been a 
general trend towards more economic freedom (less regulation) in these countries over the 
period, and that on average those countries with lower levels of economic freedom to start 
with changed the most. 
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Figure 11: Fraser Institute Summary Index of Economic Freedom, 1985, 2000 
 
The most recent and comprehensive data on the extent of product market regulations across 
countries comes from data recently published by the OECD in Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 
(2005).
53 While the Fraser Institute data is mainly based on a combination of economic 
outcomes and cross-country surveys, the key advantage of the OECD regulation data is that it 
is based on actual legislative and policy differences across countries. However, the main 
drawback of this data for our purposes is that it is collected for only two points in time, 1998 
and 2003. This provides only a relatively short single difference, and many of the outcome 
variables that we are interested in are not yet widely available across countries for such recent 
years, particularly at the industry level.  
                                                 
53 Data and full description are available from the OECD at www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2005doc.nsf/linkto/eco-
wkp(2005)6,  www.oecd.org/eco/pmr  All variables are measured on a scale of 1-6. 
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Figure 12: OECD Summary Index of product market regulations 
 
Figure 12 shows changes over five years 1998 to 2003 in the OECD’s overall index of 
product market regulations. Over this period we also see convergence in levels of regulation – 
countries with higher initial levels of regulation have on average experienced a greater 
reduction in regulation. Looking across countries, Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005) 
categorise countries into those that are "relatively liberal" - including the UK, US, Ireland and 
Denmark, "relatively restrictive" - including Poland, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, France, 
Hungary and Spain, with the others being in between. However, the fact that the cross-
sectional variation in regulation has reduced over time may, in econometric work, make it 
harder to identify associations between regulation and economic outcomes using cross-
country differences. Convergence in levels of regulation also raises the possibility that 
regulatory changes may not be “exogenous” in the sense that countries may reduce regulation 
in response to poor economic performance. This might bias any results towards the 
conclusion that reductions in regulation are associated with improved performance. 
An advantage of the Fraser Institute and OECD indicators are that we can compare countries 
within the EU with those outside the EU. To the extent that product market reforms have been  
similar across EU countries this makes comparison with non-EU countries important for 
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identifying the effects of product market reforms. There are also some indicators that exist 
only for EU countries, for example the European Commission Structural Indicators. These are 
available annually starting in the early 1990s and cover member states of the European Union. 
Available variables include ‘Sectoral and ad hoc state aids as a % of GDP’, ‘Public 
procurement as a % of GDP’, and ‘Openly advertised public procurement as a % of public 
procurement’. We used this data in the previous study (Griffith and Harrison (2004)) with 
limited success, and so will not focus on these indicators in the current study.  
In some cases we can use comparisons between EU countries and non-EU countries to 
identify the effects of product market reforms that have been undertaken across the EU. This 
is particularly the case with the effects of the Single Market Programme, which we discuss in 
some detail below. This provides a natural source of variation across countries, time and 
possibly industries.  
9.2  Different types of regulation 
Both the Fraser Institute indices and the OECD indicators cover various different types of 
product market regulation. For example, in empirical work, we use FI indices of the ease of 
the starting a new business, the time senior management spends with government 
bureaucracy, and the extent of use of price controls.
54 The OECD usefully splits regulation 
into three broad categories - state control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade 
and investment. The extent of change over the period 1998-2003 has varied across these. 
Figures 13, 14 and 15 show the OECD indicators for each of these types of regulation for 
1998 and 2003. For all three we see similar patterns of convergence, with EU countries 
becoming more similar over the period. State control is the category with the most remaining 
cross-country variation in 2003. 
                                                 
54 For further description see Griffith and Harrison (2004). 
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Figure 13: State Control 
 
 
Figure 14: Barriers to Entrepreneurship 
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Figure 15: Barriers to Trade and Investment 
 
In terms of their impact on economic performance we might expect the effects of these 
different regulations to vary across sectors of the economy. For example state control is 
mainly important in network industries, which we exclude from our analysis. Barriers to 
entrepreneurship apply across all industries, but their impact is likely to be largest in less 
capital intensive industries (e.g. many service industries) where licensing and administrative 
costs are a larger proportion of total start-up costs. Finally, barriers to trade and investment 
are likely to have most impact in traded manufacturing industries. However, some service 
industries are becoming increasingly traded and so this may not be universally the case. 
In the above examples, differential impacts across industries of different types of regulation 
arise because of the way country-level regulations affect industries with different 
characteristics. However, there may also be direct variation in product market reforms across 
industries. Below we discuss the potential use of this type of variation in the context of the 
Single Market Programme, which was expected to affect some manufacturing industries more 
than others. 
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9.3  Single Market Programme 
An important indicator of product market reform that we will use is based on the 
implementation of the European Single Market Programme (SMP) in the early 1990s. This 
was a large scale project by the then members of the European Union to reduce internal non-
tariff barriers to trade and other barriers to the free movement and factors of production across 
borders. While the SMP is a large reform, it was undertaken across a large number of 
countries at around the same time. This means that it is difficult to separately identify the 
impact of the SMP from the effects of other contemporaneous macroeconomic effects (for 
example, the recession of the early 1990s). 
We have used various sources of information to construct an indicator of the impact of the 
SMP at the country level. One possible identification strategy is to use countries that did not 
take part in the SMP as a control group for countries that did take part. In technical terms this 
is a simple difference-in-difference estimate of the impact of the SMP. This means that we 
compare changes between before and after the SMP in countries that did take part with 
contemporaneous changes in countries that did not take part. Various issues arise relating to 
the choice of control countries, the main requirement being that controls are a good 
representation of what would have happened in the affected countries in the absence of the 
SMP. For example, other European countries that did not take part in the SMP are obvious 
candidates, but it is possible that they were affected by the SMP either directly or indirectly 
through trade and other economic linkages. Nevertheless, we expect that the impact of the 
SMP was greater for countries that did take part than for other European countries that did not 
take part. Non-European OECD countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia are also 
potential control countries. While these countries may have been subject to other regulatory 
changes that did not affect European countries (for example NAFTA) we would nevertheless 
expect the SMP to affect the economic performance of participant countries relative to non-
European OECD countries. We will examine the robustness of our results to using different 
control groups. 
We have also investigated the possibility of differentiating the effects of the SMP between 
participant countries. This involves refining the simple in-out control group approach by 
obtaining measures of how large the impact of the SMP was for each participant country. 
Although this may create more accurate measures of the expected effects of the SMP, it turns 
out that most of the variation in the data is between SMP and non-SMP countries, so the 
  107 
control group approach will continue to be our main identification strategy. We discuss this 
further below. 
We use two additional sources of information to refine our SMP indicator. The first is the data 
on the expected degree of impact of the SMP on different manufacturing industries contained 
in Buigues et al (1990).
55 This analysis is based on information contained in the 1988 
Cecchini Report and other sources. The authors identify which industries are expected to be 
highly and moderately affected by the SMP, and we combine this information with the share 
of those industries in manufacturing output before the implementation of the SMP to generate 
the ex ante share of output in each country that was expected to be affected by the SMP. 
There are thus two sources of variation across countries: first the sectors that were expected to 
be affected, which are modified from a common list by national experts for each country, and 
secondly the importance of those sectors in each country’s manufacturing output. The 
resulting data is shown in Table III.2. The country with the highest percentage of 
manufacturing output that was expected to be affected is Portugal, with 68%, while the lowest 
is Spain with 39%. 
Table III.2: Percentage of manufacturing output expected to be affected by the SMP 
      
Country  High impact  
sectors 
Medium impact 
sectors  Total 
      
Belgium 15.6  33.2  48.8 
Denmark 9.6  39.8  49.4 
Spain 12.2  26.9  39.1 
France 14.9  35.9  50.8 
UK 14.5  35.5  50.0 
Greece 19.4  42.1  61.5 
Italy 22.4  29.7  52.2 
Netherlands 17.9 27.0  44.9 
Portugal 23.6  44.4  68.1 
      
Source: Calculations based on Buigues et al (1990) 
 
The second additional source of information that we use to refine our indicator of the SMP is 
related to the extent and speed with which the SMP was actually implemented in each 
participant country. We use the European Commission’s published Internal Market 
Scoreboard which contains the rate of non-implementation of single market directives for 
                                                 
55 This data has been used in various studies, including Mayes and Hart (1994), and Allen, Gasiorek and Smith 
(1998). 
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each candidate country (the “transposition deficit”). This is published twice a year, although 
the first scoreboard was published in 1997. Table III.3 shows the percentage of single market 
directives not implemented in 1997 and in 2000. The table shows that the degree of 
implementation varied more across countries in 1997 than in 2000, and that implementation 
generally improved over this short period.
56  In our econometric work the fact that the deficit 
is calculated on a different base of outstanding directives in each year will be captured by 
common time dummies.   
Table III.3: Transposition deficit in 1997 and 2000 
    
Country 1997  2000 
    
Austria 10.1  2.9 
Belgium 8.5  2.9 
Denmark 3.2  1.1 
Finland 4.3  1.3 
France 7.4  4.5 
Germany 8.5  3.1 
Greece 7.5  6.5 
Italy 7.6  3.2 
Luxembourg 6.5  3.2 
Netherlands 4.6 2.5 
Portugal 5.9  4.4 
Spain 4.7  1.6 
Sweden 6.2  1.2 
UK 3.5  2.7 
    
Source: EU Internal Market Scoreboard 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/score/index_en.htm
 
There are several ways in which we might be able to use these two types of information to 
refine our simple in-out indicator of the impact of the SMP. Possibly the simplest is to use the 
information on the proportion of manufacturing output that was expected to be affected to 
change the height of the “step function” representing the impact of the SMP for ‘in’ countries. 
Thus, instead of using a step function that changes from zero to one in 1992 for countries that 
were part of the SMP, we could use a step function that changes from zero to 0.488 for 
Belgium and from zero to 0.681 for Portugal. As with the unrefined step function, the variable 
would be equal to zero in all years for control countries that were not part of the SMP. Such a 
variable is shown for the SMP countries in our data in Figure 16. 
                                                 
56 Note, however, that the speed of implementation is a choice variable for national governments. It is possible 
that countries where the SMP was expected to have a larger effect were slower at implementing single market 
directives in order to delay disruptive effects on sensitive industries or groups of workers. 
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The information contained in the transposition deficit could also be used in several ways. The 
simplest would be as in the above case, where we would assume that the impact of the SMP 
was proportional to the percentage of single market directives that had been implemented by 
1997. However, this approach contains an implicit assumption that all single market directives 
are on average equally important. If the single market directives that had not been 
implemented by 1997 were on average expected to have a bigger impact than those that had 
been implemented (as would be the case if countries implement the least ‘painful’ directives 
more quickly) then we could use a non-linear transformation of the transposition deficit. This 
would increase the implied difference in expected effect between countries resulting from a 
given difference in the percentage of single market directives that had been implemented by 
1997. In other words this would increase the implied difference in implementation rates 
between a country such as Austria, which has a transposition deficit in 1997 of 10.1%, and a 
country such as the UK, which has a deficit of only 3.5% in the same year. 
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A second way in which we could use the information contained in the transposition deficit is 
to modify the timing of the impact of the SMP. A simple step function like that in Figure 16 
compares the situation before 1992 to that after 1992, and so implicitly assumes that the 
impact of the SMP was immediate. Instead we could use the information from the 
transposition deficit to modify the rate at which the SMP was implemented in practice. There 
are several ways in which this could be done, for example we could assume that a given 
proportion of directives were implemented in each year between 1992 and 1997 at rate 
proportional to each country’s total rate of implementation in 1997. We could also investigate 
whether some of the impact of the SMP occurred before 1992. 
While these refinements may slightly improve the accuracy with which we can estimate the 
effects of the SMP, we should emphasize that most of the variation in the data still relates to 
whether a country was in or out of the SMP. Figure 17 shows a refined version of the SMP 
indicator where we have used both types of information to refine the expected effect from 
1997 onwards, and have linearly interpolated the size of the effect between 1991 and 1997. 
The Figure clearly shows that even after this type of modification the biggest source of 
variation in the data is still the contrast between countries that took part in the SMP and 
countries that did not, for whom the indicator is zero in all years. In other words, the 
difference in expected effect between the most affected SMP country, Portugal, and the least 
affected, Spain, is much less than the average difference in expected effect between SMP 
countries and non-SMP countries.  
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A further consideration is that three countries joined the EU in 1995 (Austria, Finland and 
Sweden), after the beginning of implementation of the SMP for existing members. It is 
possible that these three countries implemented many of the SMP reforms at a similar time as 
preparation for joining the EU. However, none of these countries is present in any of the 
samples used for our main econometric results. 
We also use variation in the expected effects of the SMP at a disaggregated industry level 
using data contained in Buigues et al (1990). We discuss how we do this in section 3 of the 
main text. The data in Buigues et al (1990) provide the share of total manufacturing 
employment that falls into each of the affected sectors in each country. We match the sectors 
to the 2-digit industries in the industry-level dataset, and then calculate the proportion of 
employment in the two-digit industry accounted for by 3-digit sectors in each of the affected 
groups. Non-SMP countries are given values of zero for all 2-digit industries. 
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9.4  Other Regulations 
9.4.1  Labour market regulations 
While our main focus is the impact of product market reforms, the results of our previous 
study and the literature review suggest that it can be important to control for the effect of 
labour market regulations on the measured mark-up and other macroeconomic outcomes. For 
example, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Boulhol (2005) discuss the possibility that 
rising measured aggregate mark-ups in Europe over the 1980s and 1990s may be partly a 
short-term result of declining bargaining power of workers. In addition, as discussed in the 
literature review, there are several reasons why labour market regulations may have an impact 
on rates of innovation. It is also possible that the effect of product market reforms may depend 
on the nature of regulation in the labour market. 
In the previous study (Griffith and Harrison (2004)) we used a summary index of labour 
market regulation provided by the Fraser Institute. In this study we investigate the impact of 
more detailed indicators of specific aspects of labour market regulation, including the tax 
wedge between gross wages and consumption, employment protection legislation, union 
bargaining coverage, benefit replacement ratios and bargaining coordination indices. Sources 
for this data include the OECD, Nickell et al (2005) and the World Bank. 
9.4.2  Financial market regulations 
As in our previous study, we also examine the impact of controlling for various aspects of 
financial market regulation. Efficient financial markets may have an impact on competition in 
the product market, for example by providing easy access to credit for new entrants. As with 
labour market regulations it is possible that the impact of product market reforms depends on 
the nature of regulation in financial markets. Our main source of information on financial 
market regulation is the Fraser Institute indices of financial market regulation. However, as 
we discuss in the main text, our attempts to investigate the role of financial market regulation 
have been hindered by the fact that there is not very much variation in the extent of regulation 
across the countries in our sample during the sample period. 
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10  Measuring the mark-up 
As discussed, the main channel through which product market reforms are expected to affect 
innovation outcomes is the level of rents, or economic profits, in the market. To capture this 
we construct a measure of the mark-up, or profitability, at the whole economy level, and for 
sub-sectors of the economy including manufacturing and business service sector industries. 
The mark-up is not the only measure of competition in a market, but as discussed in Boone 
(2000) it is more robust than many commonly used measures, particularly those based on 
market concentration and market shares. In addition, the mark-up is the only commonly-used 
measure of competition that is available across countries without using firm-level data. 
Factors other than competition may affect our measure of the mark-up (or profitability), in 
particular cost and demand shocks. However our strategy is to used indicators of product 
market regulations as instruments for the mark-up in order to isolate variation in the mark-up 
that is associated with changes in competition.  
We construct a mark-up of value added over costs as follows:   





where all variables are in nominal prices. This simple measure of the mark-up can be shown 
to be equivalent to that proposed by Roeger (1995),
57 and contains an implicit assumption of 
constant returns to scale, such that marginal cost is equal to average cost. To the extent that 
there are increasing (decreasing) returns to scale this measure will be biased downwards 
(upwards) compared to the true markup.  
Another measurement difficulty is the calculation of capital and capital costs. We construct a 
perpetual inventory measure of the capital stock using data on investment, and use cross-
country averages of available capital deflators for countries where these are not available. We 
then calculate the cost of capital in several ways using interest rates, rates of depreciation and 
capital deflators. Our preferred “open economy” measure assumes that capital flows freely 
across borders so that all countries face a world interest rate, which we model as the US 
interest rate. We may also want to consider how the markup varies independently of   
                                                 
57 See Klette (1999) for a discussion. 
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changing capital costs. To do this we also construct a measure based on a fixed 10% of the 
capital stock in all years for all countries, which is close to the average for the “open 
economy” measure. Finally, the opposite extreme to the “open economy” measure is based on 
the assumption that capital markets are closed and uses national interest rates to construct the 
cost of capital. The true situation is that some countries have increased their openness to 
capital flows during the period we examine. This could raise the possibility of spurious 
correlation between the markup and product market reforms if financial market reforms are 
correlated with product market reforms. However as mentioned in the main text, we check 
that none of our main results is sensitive to the treatment of capital costs. 
We consider our approach to measuring the markup to be more transparent and less subject to 
modeling error than other approaches in the literature. The measurement of capital costs is 
always problematic, but as Boulhol (2005) points out, to the extent that capital is fixed, the 
best measure of variation over time in the true markup may simply be the ratio of output over 
variable costs – this is equivalent to our measure with capital costs set to zero.  
Figure 18 shows our “open economy” measure of the mark-up at the whole economy level for 
selected European countries and the USA over the period 1986-2000.
58 Several features of the 
data emerge from the figure. First, there is wide and sometimes surprising variation in the 
average level of the mark-up across countries. For example, the US has one of the highest 
mark-ups, which runs counter to our intuition about the degree of competition in the US and 
Europe. There are various data incompatibilities in the measurement of capital and value 
added across countries that affect the cross-section variation in the average level of the mark-
up, and for this reason we include country dummies in our preferred specifications to control 
for any such factors that are constant over time. This is one of the main reasons why it is 
important to have indicators of product market reforms that vary over time, since cross 
sectional variation in reforms cannot be separately identified from country dummies, which 
are important to control for these important sources of measurement error. Our results are 
based on time-series variation in mark-ups within countries and/or industries. 
The second surprising feature of the measured mark-up is that it appears to trend upwards 
over time for most countries. At first this may seem to conflict with most preconceptions 
                                                 
58 In our econometric work we also use the greater differential variation in the mark-up over time at the industry 
level, but this is difficult to present graphically. 
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about changes to competition associated with product market reforms, globalisation and 
opening to trade. One explanation, emphasised by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and 
Boulhol (2005), is that upwards trending measured mark-ups could be a short term response 
to reductions in the bargaining power of workers. The intuition is that declining bargaining 
power reduces the share of rents captured by workers as higher wages, and increases the share 
that are measured in firms’ profits. In the long term, the increase in profitability associated 
with declining workers’ bargaining power would be expected to lead to entry and a reduction 
of the mark-up to its previous level, but to the extent that these effects occur with lags it is 
possible for the rent transfer effect to dominate the entry effect during the transition period. 
To control for this type of effect we will investigate including proxies for workers’ bargaining 
power in our regressions, such as union density, bargaining coverage, benefit replacement 
rates and employment protection legislation. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD STAN database 
 
Figure 19 shows the same measure of the mark-up after controlling for the economic cycle, 
country and year dummies (our measured mark-ups tend to be pro-cyclical, particularly in 
manufacturing). The Figure shows the remaining within-country variation that we will relate 
to our measures of product, labour and financial market regulations. Our two stage 
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instrumental variables approach should also help to control for any remaining measurement 
error in the mark-up that is not correlated with our measures of regulation. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using OECD STAN database and OECD output gap measure 
 
Several trends are noticeable in the figure above. First, some countries that experienced 
particularly severe recessions during the period still show significant cyclical variation even 
after controlling for the economic cycle, in particular Finland, Sweden and the UK at the 
beginning of the 1990s. While this reduction in the mark-up over this period probably was 
associated with increases in competitive pressure, any excess variation should be removed 
once we instrument the mark-up with our indicators of product market regulation. 
Secondly, all of the Single Market Programme countries show a reduction in the adjusted 
mark-up over the period apart from Denmark and Italy.
59 In particular, Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands show a strong downwards sloping trend starting in the early 1990s. On 
average, comparing the periods before and after 1992, the SMP countries show a reduction in 
                                                 
59 We discuss in section 5.1 of the main report how the Scandinavian countries appear to have very different 
paths of both the markup and various innovation indicators. 
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the average mark-up compared to non-SMP countries of about three percentage points. This is 
reflected in our econometric results, where we find a significant negative impact of the SMP 
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11  Additional results 
This Appendix provides additional results. 
Table V.1: R&D intensity, SMP countries only 
 (1)  (3)  (4) 
 OLS  IV  Reduced  Form 
Mark-up -0.118***  -0.505***   
(industry) 
 
(0.022) (0.127)   
Output Gap  0.001  0.004*  0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
SMP group 1      0.069 
     (0.055) 
SMP group 2      0.112*** 
     (0.021) 
SMP group 3      -0.271 
     (0.172) 
SMP group 4      0.023 
     (0.016) 
Partial R2 of excl. instr.    0.028   
F-test of excl. instr.    4.66 
(0.001) 
 
Hansen J test  of overid.    5.89 
(0.117) 
 
Observations 554  554 554 
R-squared 0.83    0.82 
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
brackets, apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit 
industries or groups of industries across 5 SMP countries over the period 1987-2000. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 










Table V.2: R&D intensity, interaction with DTF 
 (1)  (2)  (5) 
 OLS  OLS  IV-int 
Mark-up t-1 -0.055*** -0.074***  -0.204* 
 (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.108) 
Distance to Frontier t-1 -0.025*** -0.061**  0.157 
 (0.006)  (0.027)  (0.111) 
Mark-up t-1 * DTF t-1  0.032  -0.154 
   (0.022)  (0.097) 
Output Gap t-1 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
SMP Group 1 t-1    -0.170*** 
     (0.041) 
SMP Group 3 t-1    0.168* 
     (0.087) 
      
Partial R2 of excl. instr.      0.034 
Partial R2 (interaction)      0.044 
F-test of excl. instr. 
(p-value) 




   14.42 
(0.000) 
Hansen J test  of overid. 
(p-value) 
   0.66 
(0.718) 
Observations 1122  1122  1122 
R-squared 0.66  0.66   
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
brackets, apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit 
industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the period 1987-2000. Excluded instruments in 
columns (3) and (4) are the impact of the SMP on Groups 2 and 4, and in column (5) are these plus their 
interactions with distance to frontier, all lagged by one period. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 
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Table V.3: TFP growth, SMP countries only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS OLS OLS  IV  IV  IV  Reduced  Form 
R&D/VA  0.266**   0.148  0.578**   0.710   
  (0.133)  (0.161)  (0.271)  (0.495)  
Mark-up (industry)    -0.113**  -0.092    -0.233*  0.107   
   (0.049)  (0.058)  (0.125)  (0.269)  
Distance to Frontier  0.038***  0.023  0.027*  0.043***  0.010  0.056  0.030** 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.041) (0.014) 
Output  Gap  -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
SMP  group  1         0.056 
         ( 0 . 0 4 9 )
( 0 . 0 5 5 )
( 0 . 1 3 1 )
( 0 . 0 2 4 )
 
SMP  group  2         0.096* 
          
SMP  group  3         -0.159 
          
SMP  group  4         0.010 
          
Hansen J test  of 
overid. 







Observations  508 508 508 508 508 508 508 
R-squared  0.17  0.18  0.18      0.16 
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets, apart from statistical tests, where p-values are in 
brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 5 SMP countries over the period 1988-2000. All right hand side variables are lagged 
by one period. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 




11.1 Labour market regulations 
In this section we consider the impact of labour market regulations on patenting and R&D 
expenditure. The results show that the impact varies considerably across different types of 
regulation. We also investigated whether the impact of changing competition varied with the 
extent of labour market regulations, but no clear picture has yet emerged. A full examination 
of these issues is beyond the scope of this study.  
Table V.4: Labour market regulations: effect on patents per 1000 population 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
 All  All  Entrants  Entrants Incumbents  Incumbents 
   GMM    GMM    GMM 
Markup 
(manufacturing) -0.466*  -0.396  -0.062  0.755***  -0.404*  -1.368** 
  (0.254)  (0.532) (0.074) (0.165) (0.214)  (0.478) 
Employment 
protection legislation  -0.540***  -0.444*** -0.118*** -0.121*** -0.422***  3.166*** 
  (0.090)  (0.082) (0.024) (0.019) (0.078)  (2.200) 
Benefits replacement 
rate -0.503**  -0.583***  0.046  0.103*  -0.549***  0.160 
  (0.181)  (0.191) (0.058) (0.062) (0.147)  (0.567) 
Tax wedge on labour  -0.020**  -0.014** -0.008*** -0.006**  -0.012*  -0.037* 
  (0.008)  (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)  (0.019) 
Coordination  index  -0.123** -0.049  0.008  0.032*  -0.130** -0.204** 
  (0.062)  (0.056) (0.020) (0.017) (0.052)  (0.091) 
Bargaining  coverage 0.002  0.003  -0.001  -0.001 0.004**  0.012** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.005) 
Union  density  0.038***  0.035*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.025***  0.030*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)  (0.006) 
          
          
Country  effects  yes  yes yes yes yes  yes 
Year  effects  yes  yes yes yes yes  yes 
Technology  effects  yes  yes yes yes yes  yes 
Observations  13781  13781 13781 13781 13781  13781 
Notes: output gap, country, year, 115 technology dummies included in all regressions; standard errors are 
robust; instruments in columns (2) and (6) are single market programme, administrative burden on business and 
ease of starting a new business; in column (4) ease of starting a new business is not used as an instrument. *, ** 
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Table V.5: Labour market regulations: effect on log R&D and R&D intensity 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Ln(R&D)  R&D/VA  First stage  IV - Ln(R&D)  IV - R&D/VA 
Mark-up (industry)  -0.454***  -0.055***    -5.947*** -0.394*** 
 (0.174)  (0.012)    (1.166) (0.089) 
Distance to Frontier  -0.118  -0.026***  0.031  0.060  -0.013 
  (0.091) (0.006) (0.028) (0.186) (0.011) 
Output  Gap  0.001  0.001  0.010*** 0.062** 0.005*** 
  (0.014) (0.001) (0.003) (0.026) (0.002) 
CMR  index  0.100  -0.011  -0.092*** -0.528* -0.052*** 
  (0.166) (0.009) (0.035) (0.292) (0.019) 
Union  density  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.009 0.001 













  (0.125) (0.008) (0.028) (0.196) (0.012) 
Tax wedge on labour  0.026*  0.000  -0.004  0.006  -0.001 













  (0.995) (0.065) (0.185) (1.451) (0.095) 
Coordination  index  -0.151 0.001 0.025 0.007 0.013 
  (0.131) (0.009) (0.030) (0.206) (0.013) 
SMP group 1     -0.131* -1.704***  -0.169*** 
     (0.070) (0.486) (0.041) 
SMP group 2     0.029    0.170* 
     (0.123)    (0.088) 
SMP group 3     -0.296***    
     (0.068)    
SMP group 4     -0.089***    
     (0.024)    
Observations  1122 1122 1122 1122 1122 
R-squared 0.89  0.66  0.49    
Notes: all specifications include a full set of country, industry and year dummies. Robust standard errors in 
brackets. The sample consists of 12 two-digit industries or groups of industries across 9 countries over the 
period 1987-2000. All right hand side variables are lagged by one period. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
SMP group 1: High-tech, public procurement markets 
SMP group 2:Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (high price dispersion) 
SMP group 3: Traditional public procurement and regulated markets (low price dispersion) 
SMP  group 4: Moderately affected sectors 
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12  Data sources 
Our main data sources are the following: 
•  OECD ANBERD database (2004) 
•  OECD STAN database (2004) 
•  OECD MSTI database (2004) 
•  OECD Economic Outlook (2004) 
•  OECD Triadic Patents Database (2004) 
•  EPO / OECD Citations Database (2005) 
•  OECD International Regulation Database (2000, and updated 2005) 
•  Entry and exit data from Dunn and Bradstreet 1997-2003, used in Cincera and Galgau 
(2005) 
•  Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World index (2004) 
•  Data on expected impact of the SMP from Buigues et al (1990) 
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